1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 2 NORTHERN DIVISION, AT KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE 3 George Chesney, Jot Raymond, Anita Auchard, Lee Scofield, James Campbell, et., al., 4 : VOLUME I Plaintiffs, 5 Vs. : CV 3-09-09 6 Tennessee Valley Authority : 3-09-48 : 3-09-54 7 Defendant, : 3-09-64 : 3-09-5178 Transcript of trial proceedings before the 9 Honorable Thomas A. Varlan on September 19, 2011. 10 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS: 11 Jeff Friedman Gary A. Davis David B. Byrne, III 12 Paul D. Brandes 13 Elizabeth A. Alexander A. Brantley Fry 14 Joanne M. McLaren Jeff Matt Conn 15 L. Jeffrey Hagood Wayne A. Ritchie, III 16 Todd Monday Attorneys at Law 17 ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT: 18 Edwin Small Elizabeth Ward 19 Brent Marquand James Chase 20 David Ayiffe Mark Anstoetter 21 Peter Shea Attorneys at Law 22 Jolene Owen, R.P.R. 800 Market Street, Suite 131 23 P.O. Box 2201 24 Knoxville, Tennessee, 37901 (865) 384-658525

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THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning everyone. I know we are kind of crowded this morning.

I hope everyone who wants to be inside the courtroom has been able to find accommodations.

We have handled various preliminary matters on Thursday of last week. We are ready for opening statements this week.

Since I know we have some plaintiffs and some media and other interested observers, I know there has been some confusion because we have this the September cases, we have the November cases, we have Phase 1, we have Phase 2. It might for everyone's benefit and counsel in these cases, if we have a different prospective. This is Phase 1 or the liability phase of the September group of cases represented ably by all of the individuals attorneys in the courtroom today.

We have a second set of cases that were filed after, basically after all of these cases that we have scheduled for a separate trial in November. The November trial is not Phase 2 or damages phase of these cases. The November trials are separate, or cases separate from those for which we are in the courtroom today. As the attorneys in those cases know, after we finish this case I plan to sit down with them, obviously

as well as with the TVA attorneys, and talk about potentially whether certain evidence from this case will be used in that case and so on and so forth. In November we have scheduled a separate group of cases that were filed sometime after these initial cases.

Both the September, what I am calling the September trial, i.e., these cases and the November cases are Phase 1 or a liability phase. The Court since these are bench trials, the Court pursuant to our federal rules is then required to take the matters under advisement and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Like a jury, we don't come back and announce verdict for plaintiff or defendant. After this trial is over and the November trials are over, the parties will have the opportunity to order the transcript, submit post-trial briefs and revisions to their submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. That will all be done.

The bottom line is it will be sometime next year before decisions will actually be rendered by the Court on the Phase 1 portions of both the September cases and the November cases.

Then again, depending on the Court's ruling on Phase 1, if these cases were to proceed to Phase 2, you know, those would be scheduled accordingly.

That Phase 2 is the damages phase both for these cases as necessary, as well as for the November cases as necessary.

Any, did I get that right, counsel?

MR. SMALL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. With that being said, we are ready to proceed, unless there is any preliminary, unless there are any preliminary matters, we are ready to proceed with opening statements in the cases pending before the court.

I believe, Mr. Friedman, you will render opening statement on behalf of all of the plaintiffs?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, Your Honor, may it please the Court.

Your Honor, on the early morning hours of December 22nd, 2008, life would change for hundreds of families in Kingston, Tennessee. When the dikes at the Kingston facility came crashing down in an instant, the lakeside and recreation and retirement community of Kingston, Tennessee overnight and in an instant became an environmental cleanup site. The damage was a tragedy, the likes of which this state and this nation has never seen.

The real tragedy besides the damage that was caused is that what happened out there on December

22nd, 2008, was one hundred percent avoidable, was one hundred percent preventable and was one hundred percent a man-made disaster caused by the TVA as a direct result of their negligent conduct.

Your Honor, I am one of the attorneys representing the many families of people who were damaged out there. Together we are here today to begin the Phase 1 of the trial to prove that the TVA's nondiscretionary conduct, that is, conduct for which they are not immune from liability, was a substantial factor in causing the coal ash disaster in Kingston.

We believe, Your Honor, that the evidence will show that the TVA was negligently failing to train and inform its personnel on the applicable coal ash policies and procedures in force and effect at the time.

We believe the evidence will show that the TVA was negligent and inadequate in failing to inform its personnel of the applicable policies and procedures.

We believe the evidence will also show that the TVA was negligent in the actual construction and building of the dikes that failed and that they were not built as designed and instructed.

Lastly, we believe that the evidence will clearly show that the TVA was negligent in failing to perform needed and necessary maintenance.

Now, our case is a little bit unusual from a lot of civil cases in that we intend to prove our case using nearly one hundred percent of the evidence created and supplied by the defendant, TVA. We are going to do that by admitting TVA's own documents, using testimony from their witnesses, bringing their reports and the testimony from the Tennessee Valley Authority Inspector General and his office. We intend to introduce the TVA Board-authorized investigation by McKenna, Long and we also plan to prove our case through the Tennessee Valley Authority's own admissions, their public statements, their conduct and even their pleadings, and, then, Your Honor, we intend to wrap all this up by offering expert testimony by Dr. Dan Marks and Mr. Gary Brown.

To understand how all this evidence is going to fit together we would like to take just a minute, if it pleases the Court, to talk about the basic background that's in interplay here.

The Kingston plant was built in the 1950s.

At the time it was designed and built to be the largest coal burning electrical producing plant in America. It was a huge plant. It consumes vast amounts of coal;

14,000 tons per day of coal burned out there. That's a lot of coal.

More importantly for our case, that's a

lot of coal ash.

They had to put it somewhere. They mixed it with water and they pumped it originally into an old pond. That went on for years. The pond got filled up. Afterwards they encircled it with dikes, which they called a containment facility. Then after more years the dikes filled up.

By the mid eighties the impoundment that held the ash, it was almost full. They didn't know where to go. Someone at TVA had the idea to build dikes on top of dikes, to go vertical and to build a structure to hold eventually billions of gallons of coal sludge. They did not use concrete, they did not use steel, but they used coal ash, wet soggy coal ash, to contain other coal ash.

Eventually nearly ten stories high an 84 acre containment facility not unlike building a pyramid, but this pyramid was built without any support other than what was out there from the coal ash.

There were problems with it, problems that were brought time and time again to the TVA's attention. Finally these problems grew to such a point that on December 22nd of 2008 it came crashing down. 1.2 billion gallons of coal sludge escaped with force, not just seeping out, but with force sufficient enough to

create a 50 foot high wave of sludge. It took out roads, power lines, railroad tracks, houses, boat docks, all in an instant with such force and with such repercussions that it was the largest environmental disaster in history in Tennessee and America at the time it happened.

The disaster was shocking to everyone who heard about it. Shocking to the public.

The people living around the facility didn't know what was happening. They thought it was an earthquake or a natural disaster.

The TVA had warnings and reasons to believe that what happened on December 22nd, would eventually occur. The first of these signs and where it is most apparent is TVA's negligent failure to train and inform its people on the policies that were in place to prevent the December disaster.

In discussing what we believe the evidence will show concerning the TVA's negligent failure to inform and train its personnel, we would like to start at perhaps the most obvious point in the chain of failure and that is an Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability Inspection that took place in October of 2008. This inspection took place just two months before the disaster. It took place pursuant to rules created by

the TVA to take a comprehensive stability inspection every year to be taken and be undertaken by qualified and trained engineers.

The author of the report, who told the office of the TVA Inspector General that he was the lead engineer on the report, was a man by the name of Chris Buttram. He offered the report, he signed it on behalf of TVA and he accepted the responsibility of putting together this comprehensive timely informative stability and inspection report.

Now, you have heard the requirements. Let us tell you what we expect the evidence to show about this report. The stability inspection of October 20th, 2008, was authored by an engineer who had never seen a coal ash facility before. Never been to one. He had never when on a dike. He never designed one. He had never seen any plans for a dike. He didn't know any rules, any regulations, any policies. All he was told was to be there, to show up on the day in question, October 20th.

When he got there he didn't know what to do. He didn't know why he was there and he didn't know whether or not what he was doing was even important even after the inspection was over.

He met two other employees, a Mr. Albright

and Mr. Dotson. The team progressed and walked around the dikes. They had no designated leader. They simply handed Mr. Buttram an old report from the year before and said here, take this, make some notes.

The two men who accompanied Mr. Buttram did not consider themselves to be his teacher or instructors. One of the men, the man who wrote the prior year's stability inspection, said he wasn't even there to inspect at all and he considered the Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability Inspection report to be a misnomer because that's not what it was at all to him.

They testified that these three men got there about mid-morning. They walked around for about an hour and then they broke for lunch. Took an hour and a half lunch break and then came back approximately two more hours and all left before the end of daylight.

We believe that the evidence will show that a competent trained engineer or group of engineers would take days to perform the stability inspection to comply with what had to be done out there. As a result, this exercise that the men went on on October 20th instead of being one of the last best chances for TVA to avoid disaster was an event punctuated by untrained, unqualified, untimely and incompetent work.

The mistakes that took place in the

October inspection are critical here because pictures were made out there at the time. Pictures that after they were taken were sent to a computer, a desktop computer, and never looked at until after the disaster. Those pictures identified certain things that Mr. Dotson referred to as "sloughs."

Now, there is a whole glossary of terms,

Your Honor, that we will use. They are geotechnical

terms. One of them that I have learned, and we believe

the evidence will show, is a term called "sloughs."

Those sloughs are areas where the side of the dikes give

out and slide down.

Mr. Dotson on his report he identified example after example of sloughs. He put those, he corresponded the sloughs he saw with a GPS report and pictures were also made. Not all the sloughs pictures were made, but some of them, and certainly crucial ones. These sloughs took place at the precise point of failure that is agreed to even by the TVA's own experts.

Sloughs are points where there is internal erosion. You see from the picture in front of us there is no erosion above this slough. That is the upward, the top of the picture is the uphill side of the dike.

Then you get halfway down the dike and suddenly there's a hole where water is forcing itself

through the dike and taking parts of the dike and blowing it out. There were pictures of these crucial things that sat on Mr. Buttram's desk. They sat there for two months after the disaster. Then they sat there another month.

You see, we expect the evidence to show that the stability inspection sat around for two months after the inspection took place and then the disaster occurred. Then after the disaster occurred Mr. Buttram was questioned on why wasn't the report done. He told the officers, the officers of the Inspector General's Office, that he had started it, but in his deposition he admitted they hadn't started it at the time of this disaster. It wasn't even put together.

In the report Mr. Buttram and his colleagues wrote that the repairs to the dike, which were the significant sloughs, should be repaired immediately. The testimony in the case is that these sloughs should have been repaired immediately and they wanted to get the attention of the maintenance people at the facility, but they didn't. The sloughs weren't repaired.

In fact, when Mr. Buttram put this report together and took pictures of the sloughs, the words "repair immediately" was deleted from the report by the

TVA Media Relations Department. The document was sanitized and edited so the truth would not be known.

Other things were seen, but ignored, in October of 2008; drains broken, but not repaired, red water seepage. Red water is another term for water that seeps through the dikes. Polluted water is seeping through the dikes and is tainted with the residue of spent fossil fuels. Documented, but not addressed.

And a wet spot in the area of dike failure was identified and again, not addressed. A wet soft spot indicating the dikes were soggy.

To a trained professional all this information was critical. There was still time to act in October of 2008 to prevent disaster, if these repairs would have been made, if things would have taken place in short order, but they weren't. The dikes to a trained professional -- we are going to put on evidence to show that the dikes in the area of the failure were in an advancing failure mode and the TVA's failure to train inspectors to recognize the sign of failures, to follow the rules and regulations, was a substantial factor in the cause of the disaster of December 22nd, 2008.

Secondly, Your Honor, one of the other areas we intend to address is negligent or inadequate

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performance by TVA personnel of TVA's policies and procedures concerning coal ash.

One of the things that the TVA did do that they were put on notice of in the 50 year history of the Kingston facility is that you have got to control the water on these dikes. These dikes are nothing but coal ash, nothing but material piled on top of material. can't stack coal ash to be built like something you build out of concrete or blocks or steel. You have to stack this right. Water is the enemy. Water that is so crucial to preserve and to establish life is the death knell for these dikes that are built out at Kingston. It causes external erosion, internal erosion, pressure inside the dikes behind the walls, underneath them and this pressure is working, never taking a day off, 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. pressure is there and it is growing. It is caused by water and it has to be controlled.

As a matter of fact, in the early morning hours following the disaster on December 22nd, while the media was looking for seismic events and while the Inspector General's Office was looking for a terrorist event or some kind of someone attacking these dikes, the TVA internally at four in the morning they knew what the cause was. They knew where to look. They looked at

their well sites, their piezometers and their evidence of water build up. That evidence told them what they already knew. You let dikes get too big, too much water behind them, too soggy, and with such force of that water that was behind them, they literally liquified the dike that blew out. They turned it to liquid from all the pressure.

where to look and what the probable cause of the failure was? They know this because it had happened before.

Not on the same scale, but they had had what the TVA refers to -- and this is the TVA's word. They had "blowouts;" dike blowouts in 2003 and 2006. These are blowouts out of the side of the dike that one of the TVA witnesses said, described them as a volcanic event.

These blowouts also don't occur all the time. They only occur in the wet fall months. Matter of fact, both of the prior blowouts occurred in October. They both occurred when water was building up behind the dikes.

We are not just talking rainwater. The water that builds up behind the dikes -- let there be no mistake that water is sluiced. It is pumped there to get the spent ash out of the coal burning facility and into the containment. They are pumping water in. The

problem with the wet fall months is that there is no evaporation going on and there is a lot of rainwater adding to that.

As a result, these two blowouts and the implications that those two prior blowouts brought with them, TVA went to its contractors and they said, we got, we can't have another one of these. The results could be catastrophic. Their contractors put together, as a result of the 2003 blowout and added to it following the 2006 blowout, an early warning system.

They drilled into the dikes and they put pipes called piezometers. These piezometers are put inside the dikes to measure the water buildup because you see, when the level of water exceeds the slope of the dike you are approaching, by TVA's own rules and regulations, are approaching failure, dike failure.

This early warning system was successful. As a matter of fact, it was run for eight months by an independent contractor for the TVA in 2006, and in 2007. And what did the independent contractor tell them in the fall of 2007 after they ran the early warning system? The evidence will show that the contractor said, TVA, you got to stop in the fall. You got to stop sluicing ash behind these dikes because you have a critical buildup, a dangerous buildup. It is recorded on their

data screen.

In 2007 an order was made based on the information on the printouts on their screens and what the independent contractor determined, the word went out we have to stop pumping ash behind these dikes. TVA did. They averted disaster.

Unfortunately, the independent contractor handed off responsibilities for monitoring the water levels to the TVA.

When the TVA took over the monitoring, we believe the evidence will show that the monitoring equipment fell into disrepair. Piezometers and well monitors were mowed down by tractors. As many as half of them were not in working order. Data was ignored. It was overlooked. TVA had a strict policy to monitor water buildup, but they didn't. As a matter of fact, we believe the evidence will show that in this early warning system at the crucial time where the buildup was occurring behind the north dike at the most vulnerable location, no one was even looking at the buildup at the three crucial points on the north dike, the point where the dikes ultimately failed.

Thirdly, you can see the three monitoring wells up on the screen right now. These are monitoring wells where seepage was often reported, red water

seepage. That happens to be the point where the dike failed, the north dike failed, the dredge cell dike failed.

The man in charge monitoring those dikes and inputting the data of the dikes is the same person who is responsible for writing the stability analysis, Mr. Buttram, who will testify he didn't even know monitoring was going on on the north sides of the dikes. He didn't even know.

Thirdly, we believe the evidence will show that TVA was negligent in the construction and implementation of approved design and construction plans.

Minute. I have talked a lot about dikes and geotechnical terms. We believe the evidence in this case will show, if I can use a metaphor, if the Court will allow me that, building a dike is like building character. You have got to start with a strong foundation. You have got to build a core. You have to prepare or steel your character or dike to be prepared to deal with hardship. None of those things were done in Kingston.

When the TVA decided to go upward, when the original pond and the original containment facility

was filled up, when the decision was made to build dikes on top of dikes, TVA's engineers warned that the exterior dikes, the dikes surrounding the containment facility, are not designed for additional interior loads which may occur, as a result of the future dredging operation.

The engineers with responsibility for looking at this situation said these designs -- we are not comfortable with going vertical. By April of 1985 the Director of Engineering stated regarding raising dredge cells, "as you are aware, these dikes were not built according to drawings."

The Director of Engineering is sounding and alarm right there. These dikes, the foundation, the strong foundation for everything you are doing going upward were not built -- the TVA, Director of Engineering pointed out to those building the dikes that the dikes were not built with the proper factor of safety. The as-built factor of safety for the dikes was approximately 1.2, plus or minus. Now, keep in mind that structural failure is 1.0.

The Director of Engineering said because the dikes weren't built to start with, they have got a factor of safety that is lower than 1.5, which is the minimum industry standard. If you are going to build on

top of those dikes that weren't built to the minimum industry standard to start with, then you have to build them very very strictly in accordance with engineering drawings.

The engineering drawings that are identified as Attachment C, which is the first plan for raising the dredge cells out of the ground, said you've got to build these new dikes that you are building on top of existing dikes with a 60 foot wide top. You have to build them out of compacted bottom ash, which is not the same as fly ash which is a light ash. You have to get the ash from the very bottom and then you have to compact that to build the dikes and then you have to build them to a ratio of five feet of slope for every one foot of elevation.

Well, the construction after those instructions were done, that design was drawn, the construction proceeded. As the dikes were built and the results were in it was determined that they weren't built according to plans. Instead of a 60-foot wide top they had a 12-foot wide top. Instead of being built with compacted ash, they were built with weak uncompacted fly ash. They were too steep. As a result, these dikes didn't meet the minimum as-built factor of safety. The dikes were two narrow, too weak, too steep

with a reduced factor of safety and vulnerable to crashing.

There was also a total lack of oversight, as the facility went vertical. The engineers, the same engineers who said this is a problem, you can't deviate from the drawings, didn't follow engineering to make sure drawings were followed. Small deviations became large deviations. Plans were eventually disregarded and actually made obsolete.

On the one hand, while the TVA didn't follow the plans they had and the engineers didn't monitor to make sure the plans were followed, the people building the dikes did not create what is termed "as-built drawings." As a result, there is no record of the way these dikes were built, even as we stand here today. No official acknowledgment of the errors was ever made.

Were coming up out of the ground one story after the other. The people there around the plant had a false sense of security that things were going to be done right. The people in the community trusting TVA as a good corporate and government citizen, had no idea the danger they were in and what was being done.

Compaction tests which are crucial from an

engineering standpoint to make sure you are getting the right kind of basic stability in a dike, were not done.

The importance of proper construction is well known to TVA's engineers. You see, they had a heads up. The Engineering Department in 1975 contracted out with a company by the name of Singleton Labs.

Singleton Labs went out and looked at the impoundment facility and made some findings and put Engineering and TVA on notice of that. They said this. "As ash fill depth increases, the ash weakens. Where the ash meets the ground, it becomes soft. You can expect -- Singleton Labs tells TVA -- you can expect significant weakness with dikes built on the ash pond at some point even approaching a liquid state."

Despite these findings Engineering allowed the dikes to be built for a foundation for more dikes and then the dikes that are built the evidence will show one on top of another like a layer cake were progressively built in disregard to the plans and specifications that were established.

We believe the evidence will show that the TVA was negligent in failing to build its dikes in accordance with the plans and specifications and TVA was negligent in failing to monitor and implement necessary plans and specifications and these were significant

factors in the coal ash disaster.

The fourth thing we expect the evidence to address is going to be failure to perform maintenance or negligence in performing maintenance. You see there is a correlation, a direct correlation between building dikes upward and the importance of good maintenance practices. Because as the dikes raised up out of the ground and became taller and taller the pressure behind the dikes increased as well. The more water that is contained in these vertical structures, also the more pressure that is created against the walls.

Maintenance issues that were routinely overlooked and even disregarded in the seventies and eighties and nineties became dangerous components of failure at this facility. This facility growing to the size of a nine or ten story building, the failure of the dikes released an amount of coal ash that would fill Neyland Stadium 16 times. That's just what was released. There is another 16 times that amount that was left out there that didn't flow into the rivers and lakes. But all that coal ash was building upon itself creating pressure, pressure, pressure that never took a day off.

To contain that pressure it takes a commitment to maintenance, but the commitment wasn't

there. You see there was a commitment to writing down maintenance issues on paper, but as the Office of the Inspector General at TVA found, those paper reports became what the Inspector General referred to as "legacy issues."

It's a curious term. We asked about that in discovery. We learned that a legacy issue, as far as maintenance is concerned, is something, a list kind of like the list of chores my wife has for me. It gets longer and longer and I never scratch anything off.

These legacy issues are, examples of legacy issues by the OIG were; found seepage, red water, signs of water coming through the dikes, erosions, gullies, roughs, rills, erosion on the outside and inside of the dikes, tree growth. Embankments that should never have a tree on them had trees growing in them with root systems that when you pull them out it weakens the dike itself and when you cut the tree off the roots decay and destabilize the dike.

Another example of failure to do maintenance is the piezometers. These are the things that, these are the part of the early warning system that are put inside the dikes to tell when the dikes are getting too saturated. They were moved down by tractors, knocked down, fallen into disrepair so they

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weren't functional.

As the two independent investigating bodies McKenna, Long and OIG looked at this found that TVA had a problem with reporting maintenance issues that were never acted upon and never repaired in a timely manner.

Perhaps one of the best examples and one we believe is going to be crucial in this case is another term that is referred to by the TVA as "ponding." Ponding in its simplest form is the creation of water through either rain, but most notably through pumping water behind the dikes. TVA's policies and procedures and their engineers say you can't have standing water build up behind the dredge cells. dredge cells at the very top of the nine story coal ash facility, this pyramid, if you will, of coal ash, you can't have water ponds building up on top of that because they can't hold the weight. It causes mushy dikes. It is the source of seepage. It is the source of internal erosion and it is the source of the picture that Mr. Buttram took at the point of the failure in October of 2008, the sloughs. You have to do everything you can to move the water off of these things. That was not done.

As a matter of fact, in a photograph that

was taken on October 20th, 2008, just two months before the catastrophe, this is the dike that failed under extreme water pressure, ponding, that TVA by its own rules and regulations is required to eliminate as soon as possible.

TVA created specifications to avoid surface water ponding. They knew the ponding undermined the dike stability and reduced the safety factor of the dikes to a dangerous level.

These soft mushy dikes were recorded. As a matter of fact, in a haunting photograph that was just days before the dike failure, a man out on the dikes wrote to the TVA in an e-mail that these are the "softest dikes I have ever been on." This man was a surveyor. This picture that he gave the TVA shows him sinking in the dikes almost to his waist. Soft mushy dikes take him down like quicksand. And this man is not even charged with responsibility for monitoring or looking at the stability or maintenance of the dikes asked the TVA, what is going on here? What are these things made of? They are soft. They are mushy. Can this possibly be right? It is not the first warning that TVA had.

TVA as a result of the blowouts that we have talked about in '03 and '06 systemwide, started

back in 2003, we expect the evidence to show, what was referred to as an "Ash Blitz." That is a catchy phrase but what it really meant is we are going to get a group of engineers and inspectors together and go facility to facility to get a handle on these ash containment ponds. They came out to Kingston and they tried to sound the alarm and they set up some specific rules and gave some specific instructions. This is in 2004.

A recurring theme of a warning to TVA was watch for sloughing, watch for these situations where you have slides, whole parts of earth come out of your dikes. That's a dangerous sign. We believe the evidence will show, when the testimony is in, and evidence that sloughs are recognized by those familiar with earthen dams, that when you see them, a dike failure could follow in weeks and months in short order. Sloughs is not just a geotechnical term to be ignored.

The Ash Blitz also said you got lower dikes there at Kingston that are saturated. That means you are not draining the dikes properly. Water is coming out in places it shouldn't be. You have soft dikes. You have red water seepage. As a matter of fact, the Ash Blitz concluded of all the facilities in the TVA system, Kingston had the most problem with red water seeps, tainted water from spent coal ash coming

out of the dikes where it shouldn't come out indicating instability and a lack of structure.

The problems cited in the Ash Blitz of 2004 we are going to have evidence to show, testimony from TVA, that these items were not addressed.

Necessary maintenance was not done. The same thing holds true for the annual inspections, these legacy problems we talked about earlier.

There was a problem with writing documentation down that pertained to maintenance problems that the inspectors who looked at this failure termed "siloing." Siloing is a group of people or a person within TVA reporting a problem and not sharing it with maintenance or others who are required to address it, as a result of TVA's policies and procedures.

An example of that, we expect the evidence to show that TVA was required to do annual seepage inspections, or actually quarterly seepage inspections. These reports were to be turned over to TDEC. They were required all through the nineties and certainty after the turn of century up until the time of the failure. This crucial seepage information in these reports were never provided to the engineers who were required to inspect the dikes who could reconcile the information and do something about it. Instead as the Office of the

Inspector General found, this crucial information on maintenance issues was siloed and not distributed and not given to the people who needed it and who had a chance to do something about it.

Now, we have talked -- you see at the very end of the bullet points from the McKenna, Long report.

They talk about silo responsibility and poor communication. The red water reports are a good example.

As a matter of fact, the evidence will show when these engineers were out there in October of 2008 just before, just two months before the dike failed, that they didn't have this crucial information about the location of red water seeps. They were left on their own to find it, to find out the seeps in this 84 acre containment area on their own in a short period of time.

McKenna, Long also reported to the Board of Directors at TVA that inspections just like we have talked about were nothing but form over substance, inconsistent oversight, lack of clarity, complete lack of standardization, training and metrics and the design of the dikes in the drawings for construction were not followed.

THE COURT: What was the date of this

September 19, 2011 1 report? 2 MR. FRIEDMAN: The McKenna, Long report. 3 The McKenna, Long report came after the failure. Ash Blitz that there was a genesis of many of these 4 5 findings came in 2004. Your Honor, I want to change gears, if the 6 7 Court will allow, and talk a little bit about what we 8 expect the evidence to show concerning expert testimony. 9 We believe expert testimony is going to be a crucial 10 part of this case. The plaintiffs will offer expert 11 testimony in the person of Mr. Brown and Dr. Marks. 12 We'll talk about what we expect their evidence to be in 13 just a minute. 14 If I can briefly digress to say that the plaintiff's two experts will be countered by a defense 15 16 expert by the name of Mr. William Walton or Bill Walton 17 -- not to be confused with the basketball player and now 18 the sports announcer. 19 Mr. Walton, his introduction to this case 20 is important. We believe the evidence on that is going 21 to be crucial in taking that into account. 22 The evidence in the case, we'll call the 23 President and CEO, Tom Kilgore, to establish this is,

following this disaster that TVA would get to the bottom

that he made a promise to Congress and the Senate

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of this. They would find out what the actual cause was, what rules were violated, who was responsible for the disaster, and, if necessary, heads would roll.

Now, we believe the evidence will also show that not one person within TVA has been ever, has been held accountable for this disaster. There's a reason for that. Because after Mr. Kilgore made his promise to the Senate and the Congress the ratepayers of TVA and the taxpayers of the United States of America he turned the task over to his lawyers.

What the lawyers did is to follow a litigation strategy. They hired Mr. William Walton and they hired Mr. Walton under very very strict conditions. This is what they told him. Do whatever you need to do. You have got unlimited budget. Test whatever you need to test, but do not under any circumstances blame any individual at TVA, don't make any criticism of TVA, don't make any finding of fault against the TVA, and strictly find a mode of failure that doesn't have anything to do with assigning fault against the TVA.

You know what he did. He did just what they told them. He charged them \$3.2 million and continued with additional contracts now approaching possibly \$4 million. What he did was just what he promised he would do in his prospectus or just what he

promised he would do to TVA when he got started. In his proposal he said I will come up with a mechanism of failure that he calls a slimes layer. This slimes lawyer is a magical layer that caused the dikes, these massive structures, to slide and allow 1.2 billion gallons of sludge to escape, rupture and liquify.

What has the Office of General Counsel said about that? Well, they said it's a litigation strategy. It says that it was done as a resulted of the tightly circumscribed requirements. It was a conscious decision to present the public with only one of the facts that supported an absence of liability, not one of the facts, but only facts that supported an absence of liability for TVA.

Just like Mr. Walton said in his deposition, he reached a predetermined result and as a result the Office of Inspector General of the Tennessee Valley Authority classified his work as suspect.

The TVA has instead of going out and getting another expert, they have continued to stick with him. He is the person we believe they will call at trial to support their defense.

On the other hand, we have two expert witnesses we are very proud to present; Mr. Gary Brown.

Mr. Brown is going to testify because, Your Honor, the

Kingston Coal Ash Facility is permitted and documented as a landfill. Mr. Brown is an expert on solid waste, hazardous waste, landfill design, construction and operation and most importantly regulation. He has had 30 years of environmental engineering experience and he has dealt with landfill and containment issues all over the eastern United States.

His testimony we believe is going to be that TVA committed numerous violations of its own rules, of its permits and its regulations which were substantial factors in the failure of the dredge cells and the disaster of December 22nd, 2008.

Secondly, Your Honor, the plaintiffs are very proud to present the testimony of Dr. Dan Marks, a geotechnical engineer with 40 years of experience and training. He has been a professor of civil engineering at the University of Tennessee College of Engineering for ten years. He has served as a geotechnical consultant over 30 years. He was been a consultant to the foundation of the largest building in Knoxville and Nashville and parts north and south of here.

We believe he is going to testify that the dredge cells were overloaded with excessive water and high loads leading up to the disaster. He is going to testify that the TVA's improper maintenance, inadequate

construction, lack of proper operation, inspection and maintenance caused and was a substantial factor in the failure of the Kingston facility.

Your Honor, I promised I would be through in close to an hour. I am seeing my colleagues trying to get my attention out of my peripheral vision. With that, I will try my best to wrap up. We have a few, I have a few other comments that I believe I would be remiss if I did not address.

With the Court's indulgence, we want to comment just briefly on what we expect the evidence to be from TVA. After all, this is a case made with TVA's witnesses to discuss and get to the cause of the dike failure out there that we believe was caused by TVA.

First, throughout this entire case TVA has denied any liability. The only thing they have admitted is that this slimes layer which was the predetermined creation of Mr. Walton was the cause. They denied that they made any bad choices, any bad decisions, that they disregarded any warnings. They have denied maintenance issues, construction issues, training issues, denied failing to follow policies and procedures. They have denied everything.

Then we have engaged in the most extensive motion practice that I in my 30 years have ever seen.

We have gone through three summary judgments. With Your Honor's guidance you have told us how this case should be tried and we are committed to following that.

What we expect the evidence to show concerning TVA now, Your Honor, is that on the eve of trial, the eve of trial in no more than a footnote in the TVA's proposed findings of fact the first time, the TVA as said, all right as the mountains of evidence against us has collected and as the testimony has increased, as the pressure increases, you know, after Your Honor has issued an order saying that they are immune for discretionary conduct they have stepped up to the bar and for the first time admitted and they do not contest the causes of the spill are a result of TVA's bad decision making and bad policies for all these years. The first public admission of that wrongdoing.

We do not believe that this strategy will work and this evidence will carry the day. Here is why. Instead of being able to try to blame poor decisions and poor policies that were created in the sixties and seventies we believe those same policies were not bad decisions, but they were warnings. They were information, part of the tribal knowledge to TVA of you have got problems with your dikes. As a matter of fact, the evidence is going to show that the John Sevier

Electric Facility in the 1970s the dike failed, it came crashing down. TVA had knowledge of that. They had knowledge that you have to build these right, have to maintain them right and you have got to monitor them.

We believe the efforts to blame poor decision making on people who are no longer here will fail.

Now, in closing, the plaintiffs will work diligently to move the case along, as Your Honor expects, and to cooperate and do everything humanly possible we can. We, as the Court has recognized, we have a tremendous obligation to our clients, the families out there in Kingston. We intend to carry our burden and meet our responsibilities, Your Honor.

We know that based on what Your Honor has said and the findings of this Court all the plaintiffs have to do is prove that one element, just one element of nondiscretionary conduct being a substantial factor in the coal ash disaster is sufficient to carry our burden. We believe we will put on substantial evidence of not just one element but all four elements that each one of these standing alone created a substantial contributing factor to the disaster.

That is why at the close of the evidence we are going to ask for a plaintiff's verdict because of

the TVA's negligent failure to inform and train its personnel. Because of the TVA's negligent and inadequate performance of its policies and procedures, because of the negligence in construction in following the design parameters for the dikes and because of the negligent maintenance that followed.

That is also why at the close of the evidence, Your Honor, we will ask the Court for permission to stand here before Your Honor at the end of the evidence and to request a verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Friedman.

Mr. Small, opening statement on behalf of defendant, TVA.

MR. SMALL: I am Edwin Small of the Knoxville bar. I am here representing, of course, the Tennessee Valley Authority. I have someone in the courtroom I would like to take a moment to introduce the Court to, someone the Court has not previously met, is TVA Senior Vice President Bob Deacy. He, among other things, is from our Fossil Organization and responsible for the Kingston cleanup work. He is with us today as the agency representative.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. SMALL: It goes without saying that the presentation that Mr. Friedman just made we did not have access to it until we just saw it with the Court. There are a number of things in it that we will object to, and, of course, it is not into evidence yet, those various matter he referred to. That same thing applies to the exhibits I will use in my opening statement. They will be only three, Your Honor.

This case, as I think about it, is more like an airplane crash than anything else I can think of. Why do I say that? This case is sort of like an airplane crash where an airplane is flying along and there are some internal cracks in the wings that you can't see right at the root of the wings. Those internal cracks cause that airplane to fall out of the sky because the wings fall off.

Now, before that plane took off that day the pilots did their normal walk-around inspection and there were a number of things that you could see about that airplane that were later criticized in the press and by various people; the paint was faded, the exterior was dirty, the cabin was not vacuumed, the tires were worn, but the problem with all that, Your Honor, is that those things didn't cause that crash. That crash was caused by the internal cracks in the wings.

As to that matter, the airline had sent it back to the manufacture and sent it back to Boeing the month before and said we want you to x-ray the wings and make sure that they are good for another hundred thousand hours. Boeing x-rayed the wings and told the airline, yes, the wings look good. They are good for another hundred thousand hours.

Now, why is that like this case, Your
Honor? That is like this case because in 2004 TVA
instead of sitting in a silo, as some would suggest,
went to an outside contractor, Parsons, known in this
case as Worley Parsons, went to Parsons and said we have
had a problem on the west dike with a blowout and we are
trying to figure out what to do. We want you to take a
look at these facilities -- and I am talking about these
facilities in Kingston, not ash facilities at other
plants. We want you to look at these facilities at
Kingston and tell us whether or not we can continue
building them up.

So this outside contractor came in and looked and TVA told them -- of course, we quoted from them at our proposed findings and conclusions. I think the memorandums will come in as evidence in the case.

The assignment of Parsons was, based on this analysis it will be determined whether the dredge

cells can continue to be utilized, as presently constructed, or whether modifications will be required to allow the dredge cells to continue to be operated beyond its existing height.

Parsons looked at everything, Your Honor.

Parsons looked at the fact that the Kingston ash

facilities were put in this shallow area of Watts Bar

Reservoir. Parsons looked at the whole history of the

facilities. They looked at the Singleton studies

mentioned by Mr. Friedman. They had their own

subsurface borings done in 2004.

They evaluated the entire facility, the dredge cell facility in particular, and what did they say? At that point in time the dredge cell facility was at elevation 810. As you hear us talk about elevations, Your Honor, we are, of course, referring to topographic elevations that come off a lot of engineering drawings. Topographic maps generally refers to elevation above sea level.

The dredge cells were at elevation 810.

What did Parsons say? Parsons said, well, we have looked at it. We have looked at the entire history. We have gone down and looked at the subsurface. We think that you can continue building it up to elevation 868.

You can continue building up the dredge cells another 58

feet. We think that they are "likely to be stable during any phase of construction and after completion of construction, including during the occurrence of a design seismic event."

Your Honor, an outside contractor came in, took a look at the entire history of the facility, took a look at the current maintenance of the facility at elevation 810 and said you're good. Keep on building up to elevation 868. And what happened? Ten feet later at elevation 820, the structure failed.

The structure failed, as Mr. Friedman said, because the load was too much for the foundation.

In hindsight you can look at it and say, well, yes, that is obvious, and it is.

TVA didn't admit that for the first time in Footnote 3 of its proposed findings and conclusions.

TVA has not contested that since the summer of 2009 when the AECOM report came out and said that same thing.

That the buildup was too much for the foundation conditions and it failed.

One question that was raised near the end of Mr. Friedman's opening, and I think the evidence will show this very clearly, is TVA retained AECOM to determine what happened, not why. There is a big difference between "what," especially in a geotechnical

situation like this, and "why" which involves a lot of finger pointing and fault and can we find somebody to blame.

What happened is important because until you determine what happened, Your Honor, you can't even begin hardly with why.

Rack to my airplane example. As we all know from common experience, when there is an airplane crash the first thing people do is they start speculating about the cause and people speculate about things that didn't have anything to do with it and it will get press coverage and it will get widespread attention, maybe that the plane took off even though the weather forecast was bad, maybe the plane took off even though the tires were worn, various things. Until the National Transportation Safety Board determines maybe a year later that the cause of the crash was the internal wing cracks, all that speculation amounts to nothing.

true cause comes out you are way down the pike and all those stories about, gosh, the airline engaged in bad maintenance in a number of ways no one remembers that none of those things caused this accident, and that is what this case more than anything is about today.

Now, in a geotechnical situation, or any

technical situation, the question of what's important -when Mr. Walton testifies I believe you will hear him
testify he is often called in to determine what happened
in a geotechnical forensic type investigation and he is
called in to make that determination, Your Honor, not to
testify in litigation.

Your Honor will hear Mr. Walton has never ever testified in court before, either state or Federal Court. He has testified in a few, very few, arbitrations, but his court business is geotechnical engineering. When he is called in to do a forensic analysis or analysis of what happened, it's done so that they can figure out what needs to be done to save a very expensive project.

The key point is what happened, because until they figure out what happened, they cannot fix the foundations and enable the project to go forward.

That's what he is doing here, Your Honor, coming in to figure out what happened. Once you figure out what happened, then you can assess the whys.

TVA is proud of what it did in the scope of the investigation. It's the right way to do it. You will hear the evidence about what versus why and the reasons for that.

One thing I want to call the Court's

attention to are the two large aerial photographs we have put up. One shows the facilities before the failure, the one on the left. The one on the right shows the facilities after the failure, shows the ash spill and basically to the north.

I want to caution the Court that as we go through the evidence you will hear people say various things about locations. You will hear people say various things about directions. It is going to be confusing because you can see that the facility -- as you can see from the facility here, the ash pond itself is canted. It is not directly north south. So some people call that dike there the north dike, some people call it the east dike. It's actually oriented, I suppose, so it is northeast. In general in this case we are going to refer to it as the north dike.

Most of the forensic documents involving what happened refer to it as at north dike. However, some pre-failure documents refer to it as the east dike because of the way the facilities are canted.

If we don't make that clear during the reception of evidence, Your Honor, we would welcome interruption to make it clear. I don't want there to be any confusion about what dike a witness is talking about.

The dike over on the Swan Pond Road side I just highlighted with an arrow, we'll refer to it as the west dike or Swan Pond Road dike. It's the dike

Mr. Friedman made a reference to we had two blowouts,

one in '03 and one in '06. To my knowledge there is no allegation from the experts that had anything to do with the December, 2008, failure over on the north dike.

The other thing I would call the Court's attention to is that on the north side -- before I go to that let me say one other thing. Your Honor, down here where I am currently showing my fingernail, there is a dike that you would think we would call the south dike. There is actually materials in the record that call that the north dike. That is because at one time, as this facility developed over the years, that was the north dike. Again, please, we welcome any clarification from the Court, as a witness is talking, about which specific dike because it is going to get confusing at times.

Let's talk about the north dike just a minute. This schematic comes from the AECOM report. I am putting it up right now just as a general orientation matter to just alert the Court to what we think the evidence will show.

This is the north dike. This is looking west. Now, when I say it's the north dike, I suppose I

really should say it is the north dikes. What you have here is you have Swan Pond slew over on the right-hand side, and, of course, just north of that you have got, you have a road.

run into is Dike C. Now, we call that Dike C, we call it the northern most perimeter dike. The concept is on the drawing that we showed there earlier there's a dike that's out there that is the very northern most dike. It's a lower level dike. It is called Dike C. As you can see, it is really built in three stages.

Stages are sometimes labeled A, B, C, D. Sometimes some of the evidence may come in and be confusing because it's not Dike C, it's Stage C that is being referred to. Again, anytime there is confusion, we welcome a question.

Dike C, as you can see, has a level area about 200 feet wide before the dikes start up again.

You can see there is a, they are labeled A, B, C, C1, C2, C3, D1, D2. That is about what it looked like at the time of failure with the D2 dike being an approximate elevation 820.

Now, these stages here refer to upstream construction. It's another term the Court will hear. What that refers to is the dike isn't built like -- and

I suppose when you start off on something like this you think, gosh, the thing is built and then you put the whatever you are storing behind it like a traditional dam. That's not true here. What happens here is the structure itself, the dike itself is built up in stages and here those stages are labeled letters. As the ash that's inside it is loaded higher and higher, it's an ongoing construction process.

Now, the white material, of course, represents the ash fill that was inside there. You can see up at the top there is a blue indication near the Cell 2 level indicating some water at the top of the cell.

Honor, is the evidence will show, one, that 1985 memorandum that discussed Dike C out there and the fact that there was some issues with Dike C was taken into account and because of that about a decade later when they actually designed what we might call the interior dike or upper dike on the north side, that's the yellow here, it was offset or inset 200 feet in order to not to put additional load on Dike C.

The evidence will show the issues identified in the mid eighties with Dike C were taken into account, as opposed to not.

Another thing, Your Honor, when this interior dike was actually designed in the mid nineties design drawings called for specific slopes and so forth. The evidence will show that those drawings from the mid nineties, those design drawings were closely conformed to. How will that be shown? That will be shown because TVA went out and did as-built surveys. When you overlay the as-built surveys on top of the mid ninety design drawings, you will see that the construction was as designed, not the other way around.

TVA does manage, the evidence will show, the water in the dredge cell. Up there in the schematic that I show right now you can see there's a little bit of blue at the very edge of the Cell 2 area. That's also known was a rim ditch. There was a photograph Mr. Friedman put up that he indicated had been taken on October 20, 2008, just 60 days before the failure. He said it showed a lot of water in the dredge cell.

It looked like there was a large canal, if you will, flowing around the outer perimeter of the dredge cell. There was. That term for that is rim ditch and the operation of the dredge cell is such that the dredging is put in at towards the south end of the dredge cell, that rim ditch is maintained around the parameter of the dredge cell to cause water to flow to

the spillway gate where the water is decanted out of the dredge cell. That is done in a very purposeful manner in accordance with TVA's normal operations, Your Honor. You will see that picture later and the whole rim ditch decanting process will be explained.

The softest dikes photograph that

Mr. Friedman showed you is something else you will see
in the evidence. There's no question but what that
happened. It didn't happen anywhere close to the dike
that failed.

If you look back at the original pre-failure geometry of the dike facilities, you recall what I call the north dike is where the failure point occurred. They were building new dikes in this general area here and in that general area there as part of that new dike construction they encountered some soft areas in connection with brand new construction. No one asserts that had anything to do with the December, 2008, dike failure. As a matter of fact, that incident did occur.

The Ash Blitz of 2004 was something else that you will hear about in the evidence. Instead of showing that TVA didn't care about the dikes, it shows just the opposite. It shows that TVA did care about the dikes. TVA witness Steve Ball will testify the Blitz

occurred. It occurred at not only Kingston but other ash facilities all over the TVA system. They wanted to make sure that the ash facilities were being properly maintained. They identified various things at various facilities that needed work. The things that needed work at Kingston and those other facilities were followed up on. Mr. Ball will testify to that and I think satisfy any concerns the Court may have.

Red water seepage. The word seepage may be a misnomer here. What do I mean by that? You are going to hear a lot of people use the word seepage. Seepage means different things to different people.

These dikes have drains. Some people call them French drains, some people call them underdrains, some people call them heel drains. They are called lots of things. The basic principle is that there is black plastic pipe, not much different than the Court may know about from gutter downspouts or a French drain around your home. This black plastic pipe, as it goes around the dredge cells inside the dikes themselves is slotted, it takes in water. Water that enters the dredge -- excuse me, water that enters the dike, goes into the plastic pipe and then every so often there is another pipe that takes off from that ring of slotted pipe and goes to the outer surface of the dike. On the outer

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surface of the dike there are going to be various places where you see water, wet spots. The reason you see that water, those wet spots is because the drain system that is designed and constructed as part of this dike system brings water to the surface and that is how it does it.

When it brings this water to the surface because the water has a high iron content, it turns red. That is about all I know about all we plan to present evidence wise on that, Your Honor. As to the technical aspects of why it turns red, it has to do with chemical reaction, exposure to oxygen and so forth. The point is that a red water seep is a matter of concern for environmental purposes because of the color the water and the chemical reaction that is taking place. word "red water seep" may be referring not to a seep of water through the dike, but rather to water that is coming through the drain system and once it is exposed to oxygen on the surface turns red and so you will see what is referred to as a red water seep. It may or may not be an actual seep through the dike. It may in fact be a drain outlet.

We expect the Inspector General to testify here, Your Honor, and when he testifies we expect that he will testify that Mr. Walton, the engineer who did the AECOM report, was a person determined by them to be

a professional not susceptible to any undue influence and that he will also testify to that, nor did he find any evidence of any effort by TVA management to influence Mr. Walton's work.

Mr. Friedman's opening, Your Honor, we think the evidence will show that TVA hired Mr. Walton, a literal world renowned professional in this geotechnical area to come here to East Tennessee and determine what happened in order to go from there to make determinations about why it happened to the extent you need to go further, and, more importantly, to determine whether or not this facility, this spot can be used to store ash that's being recovered from the river and the slews where it went.

It is important to know what happened because if we are going to put that ash back where it came from, we need to know that it is going to be okay. Until we know what happened, you can't do the engineering to make that okay. That is what a classic geotechnical engineer does when called in to look at a disaster and try to figure out what happened. That is what happened here. Mr. Walton's work is being used for that very purpose, Your Honor. It is not some litigation only.

September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct

- Q. Hello, Mr. Buttram.
- A. Hello.

- Q. Can you please state your name for the record.
- A. My name is Chris Buttram.
- Q. Now, tell us what your job title was in 2008, October of 2008 for TVA.
- A. In October of 2008 my job title at that time was a Senior Civil Engineer in the Fossil Power Engineering Group.
- Q. And let's by way of background let's talk just a little bit about your education and your background.

 If you would just walk us through your educational background, please, Mr. Buttram.
- A. Yes, sir, I graduated from Tennessee Tech in December of '99 with a BS in civil engineering. After I graduated from Tennessee Tech I began working at Mesa Associates which is a consulting engineering firm. My roles there were developing and designing grading plans, site plans, layout plans, erosion plans for substation or substation expansions. I did some structural engineering work and foundation design.

I worked at Mesa until August of 2005 and then
I went to Thompson Engineering. I worked at Thompson
Engineering approximately two years. Thompson
Engineering was another consulting engineering firm.

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- It was a visual inspection. Α.
- Did you participate in performing at Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability Inspection of the Kingston facility in 2008?

- A. That was the title given to the inspection.

 The inspection was actually a visual inspection of

 observing the features out there. No stability analysis

 was done for this type of inspection.
 - Q. We can agree that although the document you did was entitled the Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability Inspection, you didn't do a true stability inspection did you?
 - A. That's correct, sir.
 - Q. Now, did you see before you went out there to do your stability inspection any TVA rules or regulations?
 - A. I was not given any rules or regulations on these inspections. It was a considered to have an on-the-job type training for the inspection.
 - Q. All right. We'll get into that in just a minute. I am just talking about rules and regulations. I want to show you, if I may, I would like to present the witness with Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 538 entitled TVA Division of Engineering Design, Engineering Procedure. Do you have that in front of you?

 (Exhibit No. D-538 was marked for identification.)
 - A. Yes, sir, I do.
 - Q. Have you ever seen the document that is in

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- Q. I believe your testimony, if I got it right, was that you heard a reference to them, but you had never seen them, these procedures?
 - A. Yes, sir, that would be my recollection.
 - Q. If you would, can you tell the Court when was the first time you saw these engineering procedures.
 - A. The first time that I would have seen these procedures would have been I guess a couple of weeks ago.
 - Q. And I don't want to get into any attorney/client privilege matters. Was that in your preparation to be here in court today?
 - A. Yes, sir, that was in preparation.
 - Q. If you would, turn to the third page of the document, please, sir. Are you there with me?
 - A. Yes, sir, I am there.
- Q. Paragraph 1.0, Purpose and Scope. This it says "EP." What does EP mean?
 - A. I believe that stands for engineering procedure.
- Q. It describes "responsibilities of EN DES."

 What does that mean?
- A. To my knowledge that would be Engineering
 Design.
- 25 Q. "Division of Power Production. For the

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- Yes, since 2008 our procedures have changed. We have developed -- not knowing of these procedures, we have developed new ones to follow.
- Following the disaster you all developed new Q. procedures, right? Is that what you are telling me?
 - Α. Yes, sir.
- Okay. As far as the old procedures, this 0. exhibit you have in your hand, 538, do you know that this, I know you didn't know about it at the time. you since learned these were the procedures that were in effect at the time of your inspection in October of 2008?
- No, sir, I didn't know, I can't say that I know these were in effect at that time.
- Go to paragraph 6.0. Would you read that into the record, please.
- "Inspections by P production plant operating Since visits by EN DES representatives are personnel. necessarily infrequent, reliance is placed on plant operating personnel who regularly work around the ash disposal areas to call attention to abnormal conditions. Regularly scheduled inspections will be made by plant operating personnel, as outlined in Section 8.0. Any abnormal conditions will be reported to EN DES immediately."

- Q. If you back up to 3.0 or 4.0, "scheduling inspections. To coordinate the annual joint inspections EN DES and P PRO will exchange proposed inspection schedule around the first of August each year, with revised schedule to follow." Did I read that correctly?
 - A. Yes, sir.

- Q. Did you ever, in looking back turn the page -you see detailed instructions on pages 2, 3, 4, 5, and
 6. Had anyone ever gone over, I know you had never seen
 these procedures, but had anyone ever gone over before
 your inspection in substance the procedures that are
 outlined in Exhibit 538 with you?
- A. No, sir. This exact procedure wasn't given in detail, but on the write-up there before it was discussed the procedure we would follow.
- Q. Let's talk about the procedure that you followed there. The inspection in October of 2008 was your very first one?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. You had never had any similar inspections before that one?
- A. No, sir, no similar inspections for these type of facilities, yes.
- Q. You had never had any prior knowledge of any type concerning ways to go about doing the inspection,

heard about them.

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- Q. The day before did you know what you were going to be doing?
- A. No, sir, the day before I didn't know exactly what would be completely done on the inspection.
- Q. Is it your testimony that you rode up from Chattanooga on the morning of the inspection with one of the people who accompanied you on the inspection?
- A. I rode up from Chattanooga on the morning of the inspection.
 - Q. With who?
- A. Jamey Dotson, and met John Albright at the plant.
- Q. Didn't you tell us that you met Mr. Dotson at Kingston?
 - A. No, sir. I do not believe I did. I met
 Mr. Albright.
- Q. All right. Okay. Did Mr. Dotson come in his own car and leave ahead of you?
 - A. Mr. Dotson did leave the inspection after we inspected the dredge cells and ash disposal facilities, Mr. Dotson went on to do some of his other work. I rode back with Mr. Albright.
 - Q. You caught another ride back?
- A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. That's what I misunderstood. So you rode up

- from Chattanooga with Mr. Dotson and you rode back with $\operatorname{Mr.}$ Albright?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Dotson left the inspection process early because he had some other work to do, is that right?
- A. Not necessarily early. He inspected the areas he wanted to inspect with us. When we went to the other facilities that he wasn't going to be involved with, at that time, yes, he left.
 - O. He didn't need to be there?
- 11 A. Yes.

- Q. You are aware from your other work in engineering what "best practices" are aren't you?
 - A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. Tell the Court what best practices are.
- A. Best practices would just be to use the standards and research that may have been done before the function or design that you are working on to make sure that you have developed or given your, used the best knowledge to your, you know, to develop that design.
- Q. Did you follow best practices in the inspection that went on out there in October of 2008?
- A. Yes. To my knowledge, we used the best practices that were known for a visual inspection for

that type of facility.

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How do you know that you used the best practices, if you don't know any practices that applied out there?

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I was with Mr. Albright who had done several of these inspections, Mr. Dotson who had done some of these inspections. I was relying on their knowledge to help me understand what was going on, plus all my prior experience that I had maybe not necessarily for these type of facilities, but the experience I had learned that I had gained from my engineering work and from training that would help me to inspect visually these

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facilities.

Let's talk about that just a minute. You had not inspected a dike for TVA or anyone else before that October 20th date of 2008, correct?

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Α. Yes, sir.

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You had no training on embankment stability had you?

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Α. I wasn't out there to check for stability.

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I am not trying to argue with you. Ο. listen to my question. You had no training on embankment stability had you?

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Α. I had no training on embankment stability, but I don't get the reference for that question because we

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- Q. And they, did they caution you anything about your responses and how you were being interviewed by government agents as a lead in to giving this statement?

 A. I can't recall.

 Q. You knew it was a serious matter though, didn't you?
 - A. Yes, sir, I knew it was serious.
- Q. And if you pull the second full paragraph up. "TVA hired Buttram in June of 2008." That's correct, isn't it?

MR. MARQUAND: Objection. This is hearsay. It hasn't been established as a statement. This is somebody else's notes.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ FRIEDMAN: I am offering it to refresh the witness.

MR. MARQUAND: I object, Your Honor.

Counsel indicated it was for --

18 THE COURT: Respond to the objection.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I am referring, first of all, to set a predicate to refresh the witness' recollection. After establishing a proper predicate, I may or may not offer it. At least, we are calling this witness as an adverse witness. We have the ability to either refresh this recollection under the rule or to use it for impeachment which we would use both methods

1 right you, now, Your Honor. 2 MR. MARQUAND: I misunderstood. I thought 3 counsel said he was offering it for impeachment. If he is offering it to refresh his recollection, there needs 4 5 to be some kind of foundation established. THE COURT: I believe there has been some. 6 7 I will overrule the objection. 8 BY MR. FRIEDMAN: 9 The second sentence of the second paragraph. Q. 10 I will read this. Make sure I get it right. 11 the lead engineer for the most recent inspection of the 12 Kingston Fossil Plant KIF ash containment pond." Did I 13 read that correctly? 14 Yes, sir, you read that correctly. Did you tell the Inspector General 15 Ο. 16 investigators that you were the lead engineer for the 17 most recent inspection? 18 No, sir, I do not remember telling them that I was lead inspector for this inspection. 19 20 If you, if they have, if they got that Q. 21 information it wasn't from you? 22 No, sir. Α. 23 Do you dispute that you were the lead 24 engineer? 25 Α. Yes, sir. I do.

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- Who was the lead engineer?
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- I don't know who would be the lead engineer. I was there with Mr. Albright to follow along and learn

You don't know who the lead engineer on the

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- how those inspections were done.
- 5
- inspection was, if it wasn't you? 6
- 7
- I would say it would be Mr. Albright. Α.
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- All right. You believe Mr. Albright was the Ο. lead engineer? Is that right?
- 10
- Α. Yes, sir.
- 11
- But yet Mr. Albright did not author the final Q. inspection report, did he?
- 13

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- Α. No, sir, he didn't author the report. That doesn't necessarily mean that is the lead engineer.
- 14
- 15 Okay. Let me ask you another question about this document while I have it up. I want to talk about
- 16
- 17 what you were trained to do and what you actually did
- 18
- 19 Now, at the time you were out there you have

already told us you had no knowledge of any written

- 20
- 21 standards, right?
- 22 Yes, sir. Α.

out there.

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24

- regulations for conducting a comprehensive Annual Ash
- 25
- Pond Dike Stability Inspection?

And you never read any TVA rules or

- A. Yes, sir, at that time I had not.
 - Q. Did anyone tell you while you were out there that the title of the inspection that you were performing, the Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability
 Inspection was wrong? You said this title of the inspection is a misnomer or is incorrect. When did you first learn that?
 - A. That would have been sometime after the writing of the report.
 - Q. So when you wrote the report you thought you were writing an Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability Annual Inspection Report, right?
 - A. I knew I was writing a report on the inspection. I didn't really reference to the title of it.
 - Q. Your name is right on the front page.
 - A. That's just the title it had always been given.
 - Q. So you ignored the title?
 - A. Not necessarily I ignored it. That's the title that it had been given prior. I was following -- I had no need to ask why it would need to be changed at that time.
 - Q. Very good. The only document you had been given for this annual inspection you provided at the

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Mr. Dotson sent to me following the inspection.

Q. One week after the inspection, according to the date of 189.

Then we have the three sets of photographs. I will tell you, for the record, 6044 has 20 pictures.

They have time and date stamps on them. I believe that from your prior testimony that these date stamped pictures are those pictures taken by Mr. Dotson. Can you identify those, 6044? There is 20 pages and some of the pages have multiple pictures. I believe those were introduced in your deposition.

- A. Yes, sir, these would be photographs taken from Mr. Dotson's camera.
- Q. 6045 is a document that has additional pictures with it. I believe they may be mixed with some of yours, but for the sake of making sure we have all of the pictures that you took out there that day, we offer 6045, a 23 page document with some multiple pictures on each page based on the way they were produced to us. Do you recognize those, Mr. Dotson (sic)?
- A. I see the ones taken by Mr. Dotson. I don't see the ones that would have been taken from the camera that I had.
- Q. Those might be in 6043. Those do not have time stamps on the pictures.

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1 the witness on, Plaintiff's Exhibit 538. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Buttram, can you identify 3 the pictures in 6044 and 6045 as well, as pictures taken by you or others during the inspection? 4 5 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. These were photos taken by Mr. Dotson in 6044. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will 8 introduce or admit into evidence plaintiff's 6043, 6044 9 and 6045. Any objection to plaintiff's 538, which are 10 the engineering procedures discussed earlier? 11 MR. MARQUAND: No objection. 12 THE COURT: The Court will also admit 13 plaintiff's 538 and plaintiff's 189. I may have already 14 said that. (Exhibit Nos. P-189, 6044, 6045, 15 16 6043, 538 were received in 17 evidence.) BY MR. FRIEDMAN: 18 19 Let's see if we can agree on some terms as we 20 discuss what happened out there at the time of the 21 inspection. You had printed off an old report that was 22 the report from 2008, the Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability 23 Inspection Report, right? 24 Α. Yes, sir. 25 And you had that on the drive up from

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spot" was, as it related to the dikes?

that was wet. There was no flowing water.

something to be concerned about?

or mid slope of the dike.

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that case.

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Α. I knew that we would -- if we noticed a wet

Do you know whether or not a wet spot was

material that is within the impoundment and then travels

Did you have an understanding of what a "wet

in through the dike and may exit out either at the toe

At that time I didn't have a full

understanding of what a wet spot was. I knew that that

was just the general description to be given for an area

notify others there at the plant so they could continue to monitor it to see if it either disappeared, dried up

spot, we would mark it down, but then we would also

or was to get larger. That way they could notify us in

At the time of your inspection you didn't know the difference between a seep and a wet spot, if there was any difference, did you? Did you, sir?

At the time of the inspection I would say, no. During the inspection discussing with Mr. Albright and Mr. Dotson, I would have discovered what the differences would have been.

I want to show you page 104 of your

- A. Yes, sir, at the time of the inspection I did
 not know the difference between the wet spot and seep.
 - Q. And didn't know if that was important or not, did you?
 - A. Before the inspection I wouldn't have known if it was important, yes, sir, but I had Mr. Albright there to help me understand.
 - Q. Did he tell you it was important?
 - A. Yes, sir, as part of the training we would discuss and collaborate, as we would see things.
 - Q. Did he tell you a seep was important?
 - A. I can't recall if he exactly said a seep was important. Yes, that is something we would mark down to notify that it was there so we could monitor it and have plant personnel notify them so they could continually monitor it.
 - Q. Have you ever heard the term before the inspection of a "slough" before?
 - A. No, sir, I can't say that I heard the term "slough" before the inspection.
 - Q. Now, just to make sure we are on the same page because at times the word is written differently on the reports. I believe you handwrote it once using the spellings s-l-u-f-f, but isn't it is also spelled s-l-o-u-g-h.

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- I have seen it spelled both ways.
- 2 3
- Either spelling you and I are communicating
- 4 5
- talking about the same thing, right? Whether you spell it your way or another. Either one of those two ways we
- 6
- In terms of the word, yes, sir.

are talking about the same thing, right?

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- Q. Now, let's go on. Now we tried to the spell the word a couple of different ways. Let's talk about what it means. What is a slough?
- 10 I have heard the term "slough" used in many
- 11 different ways. I believe it's based on the opinion of
- 12 the person using it.
- 13 Q. How would you use it?
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cases of erosion, if you had an erosion gully or something, your sides could be sloughing off into the erosion gully. You might have a small area of topsoil or something that had not had any vegetation on it yet and it had sloughed off a little bit.

I would use the term slough just as in general

- Does slough, was slough explained to you at Q. the time of the inspection as an area of material moving out and downward from the dike?
- I can't recall exactly at that time what it was explained to me as.
 - What is your understanding of what a slough is

then?

A. Just as I explained it. I would have seen that the erosion areas that we had seen that some of the sides were sloughing off. This would have come from discussion with Mr. Albright and Mr. Dotson. I would

What did you understand it to be, when you were

have just picked up on the terms they were using at that time.

- Q. Were you told that slough was something that was important to note in an inspection?
- A. I can't recall if it was exactly explained that it was important to note, but we would have noted, yes, that if we had seen an area that was sloughed off that it would need some maintenance repair to it.
- Q. During the time of your inspection were the terms "seep, wet spot, slough" ever associated or explained to you as being potentially related to dike failure?
- A. No, sir. They were never explained in that way.
- Q. Going back to Exhibit 189 that was provided to you after the inspection by Mr. Albright, if you will turn to the third page of Mr. Dotson's GPS points that he gave to you. I believe your testimony, and prior you explained that the way points 20 through 30 pertain to

the GPS points that Mr. Dotson marked on October 20th, 2008, the time of your all's inspection out there.

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you remember that?

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Looking at the third page it is hard to tell in reference to which numbers since the row numbers don't match with the exact way point number that can be seen on sheet 2. I think they are off by one.

0. So, some --

- Yes, way point numbers 20 through 30 would be the numbers, but looking at Sheet 3 you can't use numbers 20 through 30 there.
- I am not going to try to get into reconciling way points or GPS points right now. Looking only on Page 3 of Exhibit 189, those ten points right there were points that you know from your personal knowledge that Mr. Dotson inputted during your October, 2008 inspection, right?
 - Yes, sir, that's correct.
- And if you would, I want you to go through the list beginning with 20 and going through 30 and tell the Court how many times Mr. Dotson mentions the word "slough." There is one at 20, there is one at 23, I believe there is one at 26, and one at 27. that?
 - Α. Yes, sir, I see that.

- Q. Did you ever discuss Mr. Dotson's finding of sloughs, as he reported on his GPS, with him?
- A. I can't recall at that time if that word was used, as he was entering it into his GPS.
- Q. Did you discuss it with him at that time or any time?
- A. I can't remember it being discussed at that time or any time immediately after the discussion, no, sir. It has been discussed since between now and then.
 - Q. You discussed it with Mr. Dotson?
- 11 A. Just in general discussions, yes, afterwards.
- Q. When is the first time you discussed it with him? It was after your report was written, right?
 - A. That would probably have been the first time, yes, sir. I can't say when.
 - Q. It would have been after your report was written?
 - A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. Let's see -- I apologize if I am not moving through this at a faster pace. This is important. I might be a little nervous. You probably are nervous too. Let's see if we can agree on some dates, okay. We know you were out there October 20th, 2008, right?
 - A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. We know the dike failure was on December 22nd,

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due date at some point in the future. You prioritized

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1	notes, when you were doing the report?
2	A. Yes, sir.
3	Q. And you relied on other notes from
4	Mr. Albright and Mr. Dotson, is that right?
5	A. Yes, sir, as well as the pictures.
6	Q. As well as the pictures. Okay. Then, we were
7	actually, your notes were found I believe sometime in
8	2009. I will show you Plaintiff's Exhibit 187, if you
9	would pull that out. This is a cover letter I believe
10	where your notes were forwarded to us.
11	(Exhibit No. P-187 was marked for
12	identification.)
13	Q. Do you have Exhibit 187 there in front of you?
14	A. Yes, sir, I do.
15	MR. FRIEDMAN: Offer Plaintiff's Exhibit
16	187.
17	MR. MARQUAND: No objection, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: So admitted.
19	(Exhibit No. P-187 was received in
20	evidence.)
21	BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
22	Q. According to this your notes were found in an
23	empty cubical, is that right?
24	A. It was a cubical that had reference documents.
25	There was no person sitting in it at that time.
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- Q. Those notes were found sometime around the December of 2009 time period. Would that be consistent with your recollection?
 - A. Yes, sir.

Q. And your actual notes would be Exhibit 188.

Can you identify Exhibit 188 as the actual notes you made on October 20th, 2008?

(Exhibit No. P-188 was marked for identification.)

MR. FRIEDMAN: For the record, Exhibit 188 has a cover sheet dated January 31, 2008. From

Mr. Barry Kimsey, the manager of Engineering Design

Services and attaches a copy of a preceding year, 2008

stability report. Do you recognize that?

- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And do you see your notes, your handwritten notes on this document that would be there in the last two or three pages of the document?
- A. Yes, sir, I see my notes on the sketch, and the sketch it would be the second to the last page of the document, the third to the last page of this document.
- Q. And then if you flip to the very last page you see --
 - A. Yes, sir, some other notes on the back of a

September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct 1 page. 2 Since we didn't copy on the back of the page 3 that is attached -- this is your writing, the notes that 4 you made at the inspection? 5 Α. Yes, sir. MR. FRIEDMAN: Offer Plaintiff's 188, Your 6 7 Honor. 8 MR. MARQUAND: No objection, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. So admitted. 10 (Exhibit No. P-188 was received in 11 evidence.) 12 BY MR. FRIEDMAN: 13 Now, you said on your way to Kingston that you 14 had a chance to review this report, this stability report. I want to ask you a couple of things on the 15 16 report to see if these things, if you read them while 17 you were going up there. If you look at the -- if you look at Page 5 of the report. Are you there with me? 18 19 Α. Yes, sir. 20 Do you see on Page 5 midway down there is a Q. 21 paragraph that says, "Since last year's inspection ash 22 was dredged into Cells 1, 2 and 3 to such levels that 23 the divider dikes for Cell 3 were buried and now there 24 are only two large dredge cells, 1 and 2." Did I read 25 that right?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Then it goes on to say, "Dredging was stopped in mid November of 2007 based on recommendations from EDS and Geosyntec consultants. This preventative measure was taken to reduce water levels in the dredge cell throughout the winter months in an attempt to avoid another blowout." Did I read that correctly?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Was it brought to your attention that the year before you were up there that dredging was stopped to avoid another blowout?
- A. I don't recall it being discussed.
- Q. Did you read this written record and did you know what it meant?
- A. Yes, sir. As I said, I read over this. I can't say that I picked out everything.
- Q. Well, you know what dredging is, don't you?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Did you know it at the time of your inspection in October of '08?
- 21 A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. Tell the Court what dredging is.
 - A. Dredging is just a way of undercutting in water by the use of a pump. You use water and as you were cutting underneath in the water the soil or

How did you become aware of the blowouts?

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Q.

- A. I became aware of the blowouts when I took over receiving the -- there is some drive-point piezometers and well points along the west side of Dredge Cell A. Around August I took over the monitoring using the program developed by Geosyntec. I would receive the raw data from TVA Environmental Engineering monthly. As some background information for why those drive-point piezometers were there, I had been given some background information on blowouts.
- Q. Were you told that those well points and that data that you were inputting beginning in July or August of 2008 was to help prevent blowouts from occurring?
- A. I knew they were used to monitor the groundwater level, which before they had made the repairs and everything the groundwater leveled had risen up and had caused some piping and the blowouts in that area. They were used just to help to monitor the groundwater level to see if it was still rising in that area.
- Q. Did you pay attention to groundwater levels, when you were there in October of 2008?
- A. Yes, sir, we looked at the -- as we were walking along the west side of the dredge cell, we looked in the area of the piezometers and everything to see if they were, if there were any broken at the time

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- Q. All right. I believe the camera you used did not have a time stamp on it, but the camera that

 Mr. Dotson used did have a time stamp on it, didn't it?
- A. Yes, Mr. Dotson's camera did have a time stamp.
- Q. I believe you testified previously that you believe the time stamp on Mr. Dotson's camera was accurate?
 - A. Yes, sir, to my knowledge it was accurate.
- Q. And based on, we went over this in deposition. I am not making this a trick question. You correct me if this is wrong. Looking at the date stamp, date and time stamps of the photograph, our first time stamped photograph at least from Mr. Buttram -- excuse me you are Mr. Buttram -- from Mr. Dotson's photographs was around the area of 10:41. I will tell you these photographs do not have, they are not in time order.

I believe we have a bate stamp for the time that is 277787 of Exhibit 6043. This is a time stamp from October 20th, 2008. You can see it on your screen, sir.

- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. It will save you some time. I am not going to begin to ask you here today with your limited time to go back in and check all of the bate stamp numbers or all

taking photographs that day?

of the time stamp numbers, but if I represent to you
that was the earliest one that we have been able to put
our hands on from a time stamp, would that be consistent
in your recollection about the time that you started

- A. Yes, sir, to my recollection that would be around the first time with the first picture.
- Q. Again, I am not doing this to surprise you. I believe we went over it in your deposition. I think the last photograph of the morning session was, had a time stamp on it of 11:46. I think that is represented by bate stamped number 277821. If I represented to you that was the latest date time stamp we have before you broke for lunch, would you agree, like you agreed with me in your deposition, that is about the time in the ordinary of course things about that time you would take a lunch hour or lunch break?
- A. Yes, sir, I could agree that was near the time we would have broke for lunch.
- Q. And then did the three of you go to lunch together; Mr. Albright, Mr. Dotson and yourself?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And did you eat there on site or go off site or do you remember?
 - A. We went off site.

- Q. And you got back and the first picture we have from after lunch is around 277821 is the bate stamp number of the same exhibit. I think it will show a military time stamp of 13:28. I know because you told me you are familiar with military time.
 - A. Yes, sir.

- Q. And if you translate 13:28 to civilian time, what would that be, about 1:30?
 - A. Yes, sir, that would be around 1:30.
- Q. Would that be consistent with around the time you all started back in after your lunch hour on October 20th, 2008?
- A. From my recollection that would have been close to the time we returned, yes, sir.
- Q. And the last time that we have is 16:33. I believe that is around what, 4:30, 16:33. Would it be around 4:30?
 - A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
- Q. Would that be about the time that you recall Mr. Dotson stopping to take pictures?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Now, you continued after Mr. Dotson left to take a few photographs, if I recall your testimony correctly.
- A. Yes, sir, Mr. Albright and myself continued to

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there, did you?

- A. No, sir, we walked everywhere.
 - Q. I believe you said you walked the entire dike twice?
 - A. We walked the lower area around and then came back on the upper benches.
 - Q. So would that mean you did two circles around the facility?
 - A. For the most part, yes, sir.
 - Q. 84 acre containment area? Does that sound right?
 - A. I am not sure exactly the acreage that it was.
 - Q. Did you all walk a fairly brisk pace?
- A. We didn't walk together. We spread out to cover.
 - Q. That is one of the things I wanted to cover.

 Mr. Dotson walked ahead of you all, didn't he?
 - A. I don't recall him walking ahead of us. He was walking apart from us so there would be some occasions where he would go take pictures of other places.
 - Q. Did you all spread out so you could cover more area? Is that what you were doing?
 - A. Yes, sir, we spread out so we could instead of all of us walking in one group we would all walk on a different bench level. When somebody would find

something, we would collaborate and discuss it.

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things on this own?

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24 25 Yes, sir. I was aware of that.

Now, let me ask you this. We'll get into the actual reports and things. This is a very basic question. I want to ask you, did you know at the time you were doing that inspection whether or not it was important for anything?

And you knew that Mr. Dotson took pictures of

Yes, sir, I was from my prior experience with certain things that I had gained from experience just from engineering, my engineering background and other jobs I have worked at, I was aware of how to spot certain erosion. You know, I understand what water erosion gullies and rills are and that you need vegetation in areas, you know, to make sure that the soil doesn't erode. I was very aware of that. Mr. Albright and Mr. Dotson before we started the inspection had given me some basic background on things to look for.

- So you knew you were going out there to look for things. Did you have any idea on whether or not anybody was going to be depending on you to do that report that came out of your inspection?
 - I am not sure I follow that question, sir.

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- I asked you in your deposition do you have any idea of whether or not there was any importance to what you were doing out there?
- Yes, sir, I knew we needed to visually inspect Α. these, to write the report to provide to the plants so any maintenance things that needed to be spotted would be done or if there was anything that needed to be monitored, if we found anything that needed to be monitored, we would locate that.
- Did you have any idea that you were looking for the potential for signs that the dikes were failing?
- I mean, as a visual inspection, I didn't know Α. that, but I would, you know, that is just something that I would say goes with the visual inspection. You would look for signs of no matter the significance of the area, you know, whether it was small or bad, you are going to be looking for those type things.
- And if you found something out there that was of importance, was it your understanding that you were to bring that to the attention of the people at the plant or in maintenance?
- Any maintenance type issues we found, yes, sir, they were placed in the recommendations of the report. Having Mr. Dotson along who was the Program Manager of the Byproducts Disposal, that was his part of

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his job function was that area. He was there as well.

It would be noted to him and he would know it as well as what was listed into the inspection report.

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Here is my question. Did you have any understanding that you had a responsibility, as an engineer, if you saw something that had to be addressed that you had to bring it to the attention of the plant?

Yes, sir, I knew that as we were going along Α. with the inspection Mr. Albright -- they would, they had given me the understanding that we weren't just going to wait until the report was written. If anything of big significance was noted, we could discuss it with the plant.

- And it would be dealt with immediately, if it was important?
 - Α. Yes, sir.
- Now, I want to, at this point in time we are going to offer exhibit, Plaintiff's Exhibit 191, which is your final Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability Inspection dated January 12th, 2009, along with four drafts of the report and the four drafts include Exhibit Numbers 179, 180, 181 and 182, and as we are admitting those can you please pull your copies out, Mr. Buttram, so you have them in that folder?

THE COURT: Any objection to those

September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct 1 documents? 2 MR. MARQUAND: I have no objection to the 3 final report. Again, we don't have the plaintiff's exhibits. We weren't provided copies this morning, the 4 5 numbers until this morning. We have not had a chance to look at these before, the previous drafts. 6 7 THE COURT: We'll admit at this point 8 Plaintiff's 191 and then subject to identification by this witness at that time we'll introduce the drafts. 9 10 (Exhibit Nos. P-180, 181, 182 were 11 marked for identification.) 12 (Exhibit No. P-191 was received in 13 evidence.) 14 BY MR. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Buttram, would you get out Exhibit 179, 15 16 Tell us when you have that in front of you. please. (Exhibit No. P-179 was marked for 17 identification.) 18 19 Yes, sir, I have it in front of me now. Α. 20 All right. Would you examine this and confirm Q. 21 for the Court whether or not this is your first draft 22 that you did of an Annual Ash Pond Dike Stability 23 Inspection for 2009 that was conducted in October of 24 2008 and prepared in final copy in January of 2009. 25 only question I have pending is do you recognize it,

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1	Mr. Buttram?
2	A. Yes, sir, sir, I recognize this as a
3	MR. FRIEDMAN: Offer Plaintiff's Exhibit
4	179.
5	THE COURT: So admitted.
6	(Exhibit No. P-179 was received in
7	evidence.)
8	BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
9	Q. If you would, would you turn to Page 6 of your
10	draft report. Are you there?
11	A. Yes, I am there.
12	Q. Do you see pictures, Figure numbers 12 and 13?
13	A. Yes, sir, I see those figures.
14	Q. Those are, you have them labeled "washout on
15	dike bench." Did I read that correctly?
16	A. Yes, sir, you did.
17	Q. Does the text above the photographs, is that a
18	commentary on the photographs below?
19	A. Yes, some of the commentary above is for those
20	figures below.
21	Q. Is the highlighted text referencing the two
22	photographs below?
23	A. Yes, sir, the highlighted text does reference
24	those.
25	Q. And would you read that text into the record,
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1	please.
2	A. "At the north end of the dredge cells one of
3	the lower dike benches has an area that has eroded and
4	washed out. See figures 12 and 3 below. This area
5	should be repaired immediately by filling with clay in 6
6	inch lifts and compacting."
7	Q. Those are pictures that were taken, were they
8	not, by Mr. Dotson and as included in Exhibit 6045, part
9	of Exhibit 6045 is part of his time stamped photographs.
10	I guess my only question would be and I withdraw that
11	and make it more concise.
12	Do you recall that these are pictures that
13	Mr. Dotson took at the time of the October inspection
14	and e-mailed to you?
15	A. Yes, sir, these would have been pictures that
16	Mr. Dotson took.
17	Q. At the same time he e-mailed you the pictures
18	in exhibit, Plaintiff's Exhibit 198, didn't he?
19	THE COURT: You mean 189?
20	MR. FRIEDMAN: I am dyslexic, Your Honor.
21	Thank you, Exhibit 189.
22	Q. I apologize, Mr. Buttram. This is complicated
23	enough. This is Exhibit 189, third page.
24	A. Yes, sir, these are the way points that
25	Mr. Dotson e-mail me.

- Q. If you remember this morning I asked you to look at those and count with me all of the references of slough that he made. I want to ask you if there is a correlation between these ten GPS points and one or both of the pictures that are included in your first draft of your report?
- A. Yes, sir, one of these does correlate to it. Without the map I produced, it's hard for me to know which one.
- Q. Well, okay. Let's go back and get us some history of this. When you were preparing to do your reports, you took Mr. Dotson's GPS points and attempted to place those on a map using a program called AutoCAD. Did I say that correctly?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And by doing that that would allow you to correspond Mr. Dotson's input that are right there as part of 189 with the photographs that were taken, is that correct?
- A. It would give me the approximate location of these way points to help me reference where they were on the dredge cell. That way I could place pictures, if needed, with these way points.
- Q. We do know that the pictures from your own report were taken on the north dredge cell, correct?

- A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
- Q. And do you know from your experience and knowledge that that was the area of the dredge cell that failed and collapsed on December 22, 2008?
- A. Yes, sir, I have heard that is the area that is in question.
- Q. You know that because you were out there involved in part of the aftermath, right? You saw that area with your own eyes. It is gone?
 - A. Yes, sir, correct.
- Q. I am not trying to play cute with you. You know that area where this photograph is taken, 12 and 13, that was part of area that was blown out, right?
- A. Yes, sir, that is part of the area that is not there any more, correct.
- Q. Now, I am not the engineer of this group, as I have probably proven to you already, but if you would be so kind as to look at Plaintiff's Exhibits 183 and 193 and if you would, be so kind to do that, if you will set them side by side and before you begin talking about them I want you to think to yourself first whether you can identify them. I believe you talked about them in your deposition. Do you recognize those?

(Exhibit No. P-183, 193 were marked for identification.)

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- Yes, sir, I recognize these.
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- What, for the record is Exhibit 183? Q.

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- Α. Those figures would be right there in that

- Α. 183 is just a general sketch of the Kingston Fossil Plant ash disposal area. It is not to scale drawing or anything. It is just a general sketch to kind of give somebody reference to where they are.
- Did you prepare this or have anything to do with this exhibit?
- No, sir, I just utilized it in my inspection Α. report. I referenced the drawing sketch itself. I did not produce it. I added the drawing and the picture labels.
- Let's talk about how did you go about adding those numbers that are on Exhibit 183?
- From the pictures that were taken by either myself or Mr. Dotson that were used in the report there is a note on there that shows the picture number which references the figure number within the report. arrow is just kind of pointing to the general location and the view that the picture was taken from.
- Can you show us from this Exhibit 183 where Ο. the pictures on your report identified as Figures 12 and 13 are located?
- area (indicating).

- Q. As a matter of fact, the circles that have 12 and 13 on them, they correspond with the photographs that are in the report, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Plaintiffs offer Exhibit 183.

MR. MARQUAND: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So admitted.

(Exhibit No. P-183 was received in evidence.)

- Q. While you still have that up, I'm going to ask you to compare them. Did you tell us that you recognized Exhibit 349?
 - A. Yes, sir, I recognize this exhibit.
- Q. You were asked to, you were asked I believe at your deposition whether or not that corresponded, those points on Exhibit 349 corresponded with the way points that are identified by Mr. Dotson. Do you agree that they do?
- A. Yes, I believe I agree they are close in proximity to the way points.
 - Q. And what is the reference?
- A. But this is not a map that I produced.
- Q. But it is a map that you are able to identify because it's a photograph and aerial photograph, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, you know, that is a good point,
Mr. Buttram. I am not asking you especially with
respect to Exhibit 349 to testify to any degree of
engineering certainty that these way points are
identical matches to the references of the way points
that are identified in Plaintiff's Exhibit 189, okay. I
preface it by this. As a general proposition, I believe
you have already responded to my question that those
points on Exhibit 189 correspond -- I was holding this
sideways, Your Honor. I covered up with my own fingers
the proper number. This color Google map you have is
Exhibit 193. It has a deposition sticker on it too.

Now that I have killed all my momentum, let's go back and try to pick this up. The way points on Exhibit 193, they generally match, which is the point I was trying to make, Mr. Dotson's way points, don't they?

- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And if you look, those way points at position 23, that corresponds with the picture number Figures 12 and 13 from your report, doesn't it?
- A. I think, as I stated in my deposition, with the way these, the labelling is on this drawing it is hard to tell what is corresponding to which opinion as it is shown on this.

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- Fair enough. Would you agree with me, Mr. Buttram, that Mr. Dotson's references, specifically points 23 and 24 -- or I will take them one at a time. Specifically 23 corresponds with the photographs that you have in your report, Figures 12 and 13?
 - Yes, sir, I believe that's correct.
- And Mr. Dotson refers to those figures in 12 0. and 13 as a slough, doesn't he?
 - "Slough road washout." Α.
- Ο. Now, you did not use those terms in your report, did you?
 - I believe I used "washout." Α.
- 13 Q. Okay. You used "washout," but you didn't use the term "slough"? 14
- That's correct. 15 Α.
- 16 Who told you to leave the term "slough" off Q. your final report, if anyone?
 - At the time of writing the report I discussed things with Mr. Albright. I can't say that anybody told me to leave the word "slough" out.
- 21 You told us that you discussed it with Q. 22 Mr. Albright, but you never discussed it with
- 23 Mr. Dotson, did you?
- 24 Α. No, sir.
- 25 You got Mr. Dotson, the man who wrote the

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24 25 prior report, calling it a slough, the man whose report you were writing on to issue your report referring to a picture as a slough, but for some reason that I am not clear on, it was decided to leave it off the description?

- Yes, sir, when you are out on inspections you see things and note things down. When you go back you think about these things. As Mr. Albright and I were looking back through the pictures and everything, this shows an erosion washout with maybe the sides are sloughing a little bit.
- If we can pull those pictures 12 and 13, if we can pull those up again, I would like to follow up on that. It's Exhibit 179. Now, the view on the left-hand side is the view looking up slope, right? According to your figure there?
 - Yes, sir, that's correct.
- And you see the ground, the area where my finger touched and where that arrow was presented, you see that above the gully feature right there or what I, what Mr. Dotson referred to as a slough?
 - I see the washout area, yes, sir. Α.
- And up above it it looks like there is undisturbed area, doesn't it? You see up above it going to the crest of the dike?

- A. That would be the next slope going up, sir.
 - Q. The next slope. There is no gully on that next slope going up, is there?
 - A. From this picture, no, sir.
 - Q. It certainly doesn't look like it, would you agree?
 - A. Yes, sir.

- Q. So, whatever is causing that washout, as you call it, or slough, as Mr. Dotson referred to it, it is beginning right there in the middle of the dike, isn't it?
- A. It looks like it's beginning at the crest and you will notice in my report there were other areas where benches had either silted up and they were overflowing off the side. This is a case where it has rained and the bench may be not be sloping back in toward the toe or the next level so it is washing over.
 - Q. So thought this was created by a rain event?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. As you look downward on the side the slide right beside it, it gradually disappears as far as the indention. Would you agree with that?
- A. The clarity of these pictures is hard. I believe there is some that is, it does follow down in there.

- Q. It follows for a while and then it goes back to what I would say a disturbed state. Can you agree with that? Looking down at the bottom of the picture. On the right-hand side viewing downward. The top of the picture viewing downward would be actually the bottom of the hill or the bottom of the embankment, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir, you are looking down the slope.
- Q. And as you go down the slope the gully gently eases out, or the slough, right?
- A. Yes, sir, the washout, it does ease out.

 There is more rills -- from the clarity of this picture you would probably see rills.
- Q. When you saw that picture, did you see signs of water coming through the dike?
- A. At the time of the inspection in the front of this picture, there are no signs of water coming through.
 - Q. You just saw the indention there?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Now, the conclusion that was reached, even though you didn't agree with the term being a slough, the conclusion that was reached here is that this needed to be repaired immediately, fair enough? I mean, that is the written word you have right there. "This area should be repaired immediately by filling with clay and

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1	6 inch lifts and compacting." Did I read that
2	correctly?
3	A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
4	Q. That was the conclusion that you reached in
5	agreement with Mr. Albright, correct?
6	A. In this draft, yes, sir, that's the conclusion
7	that was reached.
8	Q. You are way ahead of me. In this draft that
9	is what it says. Let's look at Exhibit 180. While you
10	are getting that out, I am going to ask you a question
11	that I think will be easy for you to answer. We have
12	four drafts in successive order. They begin with
13	Exhibit 179, and then they go to 180, 181 and 182, is
14	that right? I think we have covered that. You have the
15	four in front of you.
16	May I withdraw that question and ask another
17	one?
18	THE COURT: Go ahead.
19	BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
20	Q. Mr. Buttram, do you remember making several
21	drafts of your report before it was made final?
22	A. Yes, I do remember making several drafts.
23	Q. And the process, the exercise of actually
24	writing this report was done following the coal ash
25	disaster of December 22, 2008. This is after the
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he checks it, right?

- A. I would have done a draft and I would have given it to Mr. Albright. That would not definitely be significant to what these drafts represent.
 - Q. Excuse me?
- A. The order of review doesn't necessarily represent what these drafts here represent.
 - Q. Okay.

- A. I did these, these drafts were tracked for my knowledge so I would know what has changed from time to time. It doesn't correspond necessarily after a certain someone's review.
- Q. Fine. That's fair enough. Who was the first person who you gave your draft to look at? Was that Mr. Albright?
 - A. That would have been Mr. Albright.
- Q. After we look at 179 let's look at 180 and specifically I want you to go to page 6 where we are talking about the washout on the dike bench that Mr. Dotson referred to as a slough.
 - A. Yes, sir, I am there.
- Q. Now, if we can, the language that was quoted from 179 I believe it is the same. You see that?

 MR. MARQUAND: We'll stipulate it's the
- MR. MARQUAND: We'll stipulate it's the same.
- MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

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- Q. This is Exhibit 182. Can you identify that as the final draft? I believe this is the one, this is different from the others because it has an executive summary on the front.
- A. Yes, I recognize this as another draft of what would have been the final.
 - Q. And 182 does add the executive summary?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Whose idea was it to add the executive summary?
- A. TVA Media Relations.
 - Q. When you were out there on that day in October did you have any checklist to work off of? In other words, a list of things you needed to look for and check off a list as you went?
- A. No, sir, I was not given any type of check list. I was with John Albright who had been on these inspections.
- Q. Did Mr. Albright or Mr. Dotson have a checklist?
 - A. Not to my knowledge they did not.
- Q. Since the inspection has it come to your attention there was a checklist?
- 24 A. No, sir.
- 25 Q. Never heard of that before?

- A. No, sir, I have not heard of a checklist.
- Q. There were other references for immediate repairs that needed to, that you found during your inspection that were included in your original report that were removed at the recommendation of Media Relations, weren't there?
 - A. Yes.

- Q. I give you an example. The photograph that you took in your final report of the floating coal ash -- I believe looking at your final report there is a picture on Page 4.
 - A. Yes, sir, that would be Figure 3.
- Q. Picture 3. If you can bring that up. This is Exhibit 191, Picture 3.
 - Now, at the time you did your draft you included that the floating ash from that pond needed to be removed immediately, right?
 - A. Initially in the report I had written it needed to be removed immediately.
 - Q. That was removed at the suggestion of Media Relations?
 - A. After the suggestion, yes, sir, I removed it on my own accord.
- Q. And then there was another reference to another area that you referred to as a washout. If you

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there in October of 2008, now, wasn't it?

- A. Yes, sir, the proper people knew about it.
 - Q. I believe you made the, you have either testified or maybe told me that the whole purpose of using the term "immediately" was to get the attention of the people in maintenance, fair enough?
 - A. That's correct.
 - Q. You wanted to reach out to them and get their attention, right?
 - A. Yes. As you were reading the report, you would want to use words to emphasize certain things, that's correct.
 - Q. After placing this emphasis on that work that needed to be done, let's go ahead and tell us what you did to make sure that this immediate maintenance was done. You made it known to somebody, right?
 - A. Yes, as I said, Jamey Dotson, who is part of the Byproducts Disposal Group helped in maintaining those dredge cells was there and knew about it. We also were dealing with James Settles that day and had discussion.
 - Q. You all sought out Mr. Settles, right?
 - A. We ran into him on the day of the inspection.
 - Q. You ran into him. Okay. Was it your intention to make somebody at the plant know about these maintenance items that needed to be addressed?

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- Yes, sir, Mr. Dotson deals with them. was in his area of his job, I believe. He was a Byproducts representative that day.
- Who is Mr. Settles? Tell the Court who is he Ο. is.
- Mr. Settles, to my knowledge, was, I believe, the field supervisor for the dredge cells.
- Was he directed to make the repair, the 0. immediate repairs that are reflected on your reports right then in October of, October 20th, 2008, while you were present on the scene?
 - Α. I can't recall.
- I guess that question may not have come out right. Did you communicate the information or was it communicated in your presence to Mr. Settles that these repairs are here and they need to be taken care of immediately?
- We did communicate with him. I can't recall exactly the full discussion and what all was communicated to him that day.
- In substance was the information that is in Ο. your report or your draft report, was that information communicated to Mr. Settles?
- I can't say exactly all that information was communicated to him.

- Q. What about the washout or slough on the north dike that we started this point in the examination with. Was that information imparted to Mr. Settles that it was maintenance that needed to be taken care of immediately?
- A. As I said, I am not sure exactly what communication was stated to him.
- Q. Other than your report, how was that information to get to maintenance through Jamey Dotson?
- A. Mr. Dotson spoke, Mr. Dotson as part of the Byproducts Group, his group would have been doing some of those repairs.
- Q. Are you assuming he would have taken care of it or do you know he was directed, as by yourself as the engineer writing up this report, that this is maintenance work that needs to be done?
 - A. I can't say he was directed to do it, no, sir.
- Q. The fact is this was your first inspection, you were just trying to learn it the best you could. You weren't in a position to direct anybody to do anything, were you, Mr. Buttram?
- A. I can't say I wasn't in a position to direct.

 I would have discussed it with the people that it needed to be discussed with.
 - Q. But you didn't, did you?
 - A. I can't say what all communication was done

September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct 1 that day. 2 The very next month TVA sent you out again as Q. 3 a lead engineer for another dike inspection, didn't 4 they? 5 Sir, I wasn't the lead engineer at Kingston. No, no. I am not, we have already gone 6 7 through that disagreement. I am not talking about 8 Kingston now. 9 You said "again." Α. 10 Ο. Okay. I apologize for my wording. Let me try 11 it again. You don't even need Mr. Marquand. You are 12 getting pretty good at this. I don't mean to make light 13 of it. You did another inspection didn't you, a dike 14 inspection after Kingston, correct? 15 16 Α. Yes, sir, that's correct. 17 Q. All right. Were you the lead inspector on 18 that inspection? 19 Yes, sir, I was the only representative Α. 20 engineer from my group out there. I would have been the 21 lead engineer for that. 22 And that took place less than a month after 23 the Kingston inspection? 24 Α. I can't recall exactly how long -- it was in 25 November, 2008.

- Q. You didn't have any, do additional study work or training between the Kingston inspection and the Tuscumbia inspection, right?
- A. Yes, sir, it was out at the Colbert Fossil Plant.
- Q. Right out of Tuscumbia, Alabama, Colbert
 County. You didn't have any training since you did that
 inspection in October at Kingston and the time that you
 went to Colbert, correct?
- A. No, sir. There was no extra training in between those two inspections.
- Q. I don't mean extra training. There wasn't any other training, was there?
 - A. No, sir.
- Q. Okay. But yet you were the lead inspector on that one?
- 17 A. Yes, sir, I was the lead inspector.
 - Q. Had you finished your report on the Colbert inspection by the time of the disaster of December 22, 2008?
 - A. No, sir. That report hadn't been written either.
 - Q. I want you to look at Plaintiff's Exhibit

 1484. Before you say anything about it, I want you to
 take a look at it and tell me if you can identify it.

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1	Mr. Settles, have you ever seen Exhibit 1484 before? I
2	mean, Mr. Buttram. I am sorry.
3	(Exhibit No. P-1484 was marked for
4	identification.)
5	A. I can't recall that I have seen this specific
6	exhibit, no, sir.
7	Q. Okay. I want to ask you this. Have you
8	attended any safety seminars on evaluation on existing
9	dams?
10	MR. MARQUAND: Objection, Your Honor.
11	This deals with matters post spill. It deals with post
12	remedial measures and certainly isn't relevant in this
13	case.
14	MR. FRIEDMAN: May I respond Your Honor?
15	THE COURT: Yes.
16	MR. FRIEDMAN: It is post spill. It
17	happened after this spill. We're offering it for
18	another purpose. That would be feasibility,
19	availability of training. For information purposes,
20	other than to show that this should have been done
21	before the inspection or before the October inspection,
22	just the fact that there's training available out there.
23	THE COURT: I will sustain the objection
24	to the question as asked, but allow you to pursue
25	questioning along the lines that you suggested.
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at TVA, have you had any training whatsoever prior to October or even December of 2008, for that matter, in anything related to stability inspections or maintenance of earthen embankments?

- No, sir. In that respect I didn't have any training from TVA.
- Going back to the stability report that you Ο. did -- I am talking about the final copy. This one is Exhibit 191. If you go to the very back of it. I don't mean very back. I want to talk about Page 11. As you get there, that is a list, is it not, of things to be done pursuant to the annual inspection?
- Α. Yes, sir, that would be the recommendations page.
- And the recommendation page, is that not a summary of the actions -- I believe it would cover pages 11 and 12 of recommendations for instructions concerning maintenance that result from your actual inspection in this case, the October inspection.
- Α. Yes, sir, these would be the recommendations that came from, that were listed in the report itself from the October inspection.
- And if you knew one or more of the things that are on the list had already been completed, they wouldn't be on the recommendation list, would they? Or

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September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct 1 about some of your other responsibilities that aren't 2 stability inspection related. I believe your testimony was you took over a program in July or August of 2008 3 where you would take over data input for water levels in 4 5 the dikes? I took over the responsibility of yes, 6 7 receiving the monitor data from TVA Environmental 8 Engineering. I would receive it monthly. Once 9 receiving it I would place it into the program that was 10 in an Excel spreadsheet created by Geosyntec. Once that 11 data was entered, I would check to see what the levels 12 were in regard to the ground surface. 13 Q. If you would, please, I want to ask you if you 14 would kindly look at Plaintiff's Exhibits 186 and 1552. I ask you if you would identify those for the record. 15 16 (Exhibit Nos. P-186, 1552 were marked for identification.) 17 18 Exhibit 186 and Exhibit 1552 look to be the 19 roles and responsibilities that were created by me after 20 receiving this responsibility. It was kind of our 21 action plan. 22 MR. FRIEDMAN: Offer Exhibits 186 and 23 1552, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: So admitted. (Exhibit Nos. P-186, 1552 were 25

at the time." Did I read that right?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

the TVA in 2008 to monitor the buildup of water in

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dikes?

Can you restate that question?

Q. I am asking if that sentence is correct. Were the piezometers and dewatering wells used to determine and monitor the groundwater levels at the time. Were those used in 2008, when you took over the program, to monitor water buildup in the dikes?

Were piezometers and wells in place used by

- A. This sentence comes from the background information trying to explain the initial purpose of the piezometers. Why they were put in was to help to understand the groundwater level before they did the repair in that area.
 - Q. Okay.
- A. After the repair was over having that data, having those piezometers there, they were just decided to leave it in to have that data so that the groundwater could be still be monitored and looked at.
- Q. Let's look at Exhibit 1552. How is Exhibit 1552 different, if at all, from Exhibit 186? Are these the same or are they different? One has a date at the bottom in the place of current contacts. 1552 has a

date of August 4th, 2008, and current contacts and has yourself and Mr. Matt Williams, is that right?

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Yes, sir, on the last page it has Mr. Dotson. 1552 has the Kingston PEU was added and her contact

has some additional information, is that right?

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information as well. 186 had Jamey Dotson. The second page of 1552

- That is how they differ? Q.
- Α. Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

- Did you create both of these documents? Q.
- No. I was the initial creator of it. I can't Α. be certain that I would have, but I think I would have because I was in essence the owner. I was asked to create this so we could kind of have an action or roles and responsibilities between the different TVA groups that were using this data.
- Let's look at the responsibilities outlined. Under TVA Environmental Services under both documents it says in the first bullet point that "TVA Environmental Services is responsible for monitoring the wells and piezometers on a monthly basis." Did I read that right?
 - Yes, sir. Α.
- Did TVA monitor the wells and piezometers at Kingston on a monthly basis?

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- To my knowledge, sir, yes, they did.
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- Did they monitor the wells and piezometers on the north side of the dredge cell?
 - My responsibilities were for the west side. Α.

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- would receive -- the data I received was two
- spreadsheets. My role was to monitor the piezometers and dewatering -- I received data for the piezometers
- and dewatering well points for the west side. That was
- the data my responsibility was to monitor.
- 10 Mr. Buttram, do you know if anyone in the TVA
- 11 was responsible for monitoring the wells and piezometers
- 12 on the north side of the dredge cell, the place at the
- 13 dredge cell where the failure occurred in 2008?
 - To my knowledge, sir --
 - At the time you were with TVA. Ο.
 - No, sir, at the time I did not know that Α.
 - anybody was responsible for monitoring those wells.
 - Did you know there were even any wells located
- 19 on the north side?
- Α. From our inspection and pictures we had
- pictures of the wells. They were there. They were
- 22 monitoring wells. They weren't piezometers that we
- 23 used. I knew those wells were there. I didn't know the
- 24 function of them.
 - These rules and regulations they say they

September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct 1 don't differentiate between wells and piezometers, do 2 they? 3 MR. MARQUAND: Objection. Mischaracterization. These aren't rules and 4 5 regulations. This is a document the witness typed up. MR. FRIEDMAN: The witness testified these 6 7 are documents the witness typed up to outline 8 responsibilities. 9 Yes, sir, it says --Α. 10 THE COURT: All right. Well, I will overrule the objection. Mindful, this isn't a jury 11 12 trial, but the same in a bench trial questions of 13 counsel are not evidence. The evidence comes from the 14 witness stand. Go ahead. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: 15 16 You did draft these outlined responsibilities, 17 didn't you? 18 Yes, sir, as I said, these were if you read in the background information the piping and seepage was 19 20 discovered at the Dredge Cell 3. Dredge Cell 3 didn't 21 go to the north dike. It was on the west. 22 piezometers and well points mentioned here were on the 23 best dike. That is what the roles and responsibilities were created for. 24 25 Are you telling the Court that the

responsibility to monitor wells and piezometers ended at the west dike?

A. To my knowledge, this is what I was given to do. Beyond that I do not know, sir.

Q. And these responsibilities that you drafted in these two exhibits, that only pertained to the west dike, right, if I understand you correctly?

A. These roles and responsibilities, yes, sir, were corresponding with the monitoring on the west dike.

Q. Mr. Buttram, point out for the Court where either one of these documents limited responsibilities to the west side.

A. I believe with the background which references the 33 piezometers and dewatering wells on the west side. I can't understand why we would give background information for that and point the responsibility to the other wells without mentioning them here.

Q. You would have to have an understanding of the background in order to understand the limitation you are

testifying about. Is that what you are telling us?

A. Yes, sir, and then if you also see it says for more information you can see Geosyntec's report which would outline the repairs and installation of these piezometers that these roles and responsibilities are outlined.

- Q. Did you ever read that report, Mr. Buttram, that you are talking about, the Geosyntec's report?
- A. Yes, I went through it to give me some background information on the reasons that these piezometers and the dewatering well system was in place.
- Q. You weren't even provided with your own copy of that, were you?
- A. No, sir, I didn't have any own copy. I had access to hard copies.
- Q. You just happened to see come information in that, but never reviewed the whole report, did you?
- A. I can't say I reviewed the exact full report, no, sir. I did review the report.
- Q. Now, you weren't aware until you got out there on the inspection in October of 2008 that there were monitoring wells on the north side?
- A. I can't say that I knew that the data that I received -- I received two sets of data. I can't say that the data that I received had the wells from the north side, no, sir.
- Q. I appreciate that answer. I was trying to make my question a little more limited. I know you say you didn't know the data you received, that you were to input -- maybe I tell you what. Let me back up and try to make a clear record on what you were doing. You

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- A. Yes, sir, could monitor that with certain instruments of which we use the drive-point piezometers out there, but we didn't use the well points. It specifically states on the program that I have that these wells were not to be used for monitoring the groundwater.
- Q. All right. You are getting way ahead of me.

 I'm trying to catch up with you now. The piezometers

 that you use, when those are overflowing, those tell you
 that the phreatic surface or water within the dikes is.

are at a critical level, right?

wasn't there.

A. Yes, sir, if I saw a Piezometer overflowing I would expect to be seeing it coming out the dike. That

When the piezometers are overflowing, it tells you you

Q. I am not saying what you saw or didn't saw.

am trying to talk about in general terms what it means when you have a piezometer which is pipe going down in the ground built a certain way to let you measure water.

When you see that water coming out of it, it tells you it's a warning that our phreatic level is approaching saturation, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

- Q. All right. Now, from what I gather you don't believe the same is true with respect to wells, is that right?
- A. For these dewatering wells that were out there, no, sir, I don't believe they were with that respect.
- Q. But yet you all have listed wells to be monitored on the two exhibits that you created, 1552 and 186, to be monitored on a monthly basis?
- A. Yes, sir, we had the instruments there. We went ahead to grab the extra data, but not to be used in the sense of monitoring the groundwater level.

- Q. And the well point photo that you took, do you recall where that was taken in your report? We can get that out, if we need to. I want to make that clear on the record. Do you remember where that was?
- A. I can't recall exactly where along the west dike it was.
 - Q. It was on the west dike though?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Now, to make the record clear, you didn't know whether or not any data was being inputted from monitoring wells on the north part of the dike, did you?
- A. From my role and responsibility in the spreadsheet that Geosyntec created, that did not include the monitoring wells on the north side.
- Q. I want to ask you if you would look at -- I have a couple of housekeeping matters here before I finish this line of questioning. I would like to, if you would, please, just take a minute and see if you can identify Exhibits 3609, 606, and 1585. Have you had a chance to look at those?

(Exhibit Nos. P-3609, 606, 1585 were marked for identification.)

- A. Yes, sir, 3609, 606 and 1585?
- Q. Right. Let's start with 606. Can you identify that for the record?

A. Yes, sir, this would be the output you would see after entering the raw data that is received from -Q. Offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 606, Your Honor.

MR. MARQUAND: No objection.

THE COURT: So admitted.

(Exhibit No. P-606 was received in evidence.)

BY MR. FRIEDMAN:

- Q. Can you explain for us with the page that you have there in front of you what this exhibit is and how you use it as part of your duties at TVA?
- A. I wouldn't actually input data into the sheet you see in front of you. This is just the output that is created from the data. It reads information from another worksheet in that spreadsheet.
- Q. After you manually put in data into the program, this is one of the things that is produced?
 - A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. Can you identify Exhibit 1585 for the record.
- A. 1585 looks to be a sheet with the directions. It also has the worksheet tab of where the data, the raw data would have been entered.
- Q. You would, this would be the program set up by Geosyntec on which you could electronically enter the data provided to you by Mr. Williams, is that correct?

- A. Yes, sir, most of these pages I am familiar with. Some of them in the back -- just with not seeing it all in one sheet, it's hard to tell if they are all from that program.
- Q. If we printed it out, it would reach from one side of the courtroom to the other. We had to break it up. These are all data points that would be entered manually, is that right?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. When you entered, for example, in the very back of the exhibit if you would go to like the fourth page from the back. You see that spreadsheet. You will see entries. There are entries on this sheet. Many of them would say, "dry." Do you see that?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Would you manually input a designation that would say dry?
- A. Yes, sir, I would. You have to put dry, if no data was received from that piezometer.
- Q. Would that apply to a piezometer that was broken, for example, that you got no data on?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. So you would be entering designations as dry for piezometers that in actuality weren't functioning?

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- A. I can't exactly recall, but to my knowledge I should have been in the office.
 - Q. Was this information provided to you late?
- A. I can't recall exactly the date I would receive the monthly information. I can't say that if it was late how late it would have been.
- Q. It says here in the first line, "sorry for the delay." You see that?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. "I have been holding on this until Paul Smith got another chance to investigate the site. You will notice several piezometers from the KIF piezometers and well points that do not have any information and it says (blacked out)." Did I read that correctly?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Does that help refresh your recollection as to what was going on at the time?
 - A. Somewhat, yes, sir.
 - Q. Tell us what was going on then.
- A. Well, just by reading the e-mail they seem to be late because they wanted to go back and get a better understanding which ones were destroyed to keep better track so we could get them repaired.
- Q. What did do you then when you received this information? Did you input it?

- A. The information for the destroyed --
 - Q. Just the information that they did provide to you?
 - A. Yes, sir, I can't say I input it exactly that day, but within a couple of days I would.
 - Q. I am sorry. I am not meaning to talk over you. I apologize. Were you finished? You said, I think I heard you say you did it in a couple of days?
 - A. I would try to do it within a couple of days, yes, sir.
 - Q. Do you know if you inputted this information that is represented in Exhibit 3609 prior to the dike failure on December 22, 2008?
 - A. I can't recall if I input it before the dike failure or not.
 - Q. Did you do any type of analysis of the information, when you put it in?
 - A. No, sir, there is no analysis required beyond inputting the data and checking the levels on the chart.
 - Q. Did you during your time inputting data did you ever have any red flags or have any points in the red area showing that the dikes were saturated with water?
 - A. The time that I had entered it there were no piezometers that entered into the red zone.

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that would tell you whether or not you had a reading in the red? Do you know? No, sir. I am not sure. I don't recall that being done.

failure and the disaster in December 22, 2008, why would

anyone want to go back in and alter the Geosyntec forms

Mr. Buttram, why would anyone after the dike

- Well, why would you ask Geosyntec for the password to their program so you could go back in and mess with it or alter it?
- The well points that I have stated which were Α. not in regards to monitoring the water level, as can be seen on the output, since they were showing in the red just to add more clarity to the chart we wanted to remove the well points. Those well points could be removed without a password.
- Let's see if I got this right. After the dike failure on December 22, 2008, you were going back into the spreadsheets trying to take out readings where your wells were showing red or warnings, is that what you were doing?
- No, sir, they were not showing warnings. they had been showing warnings, I would have alerted the people at the time.
 - They were showing wells in the red weren't

they?

- A. If we can go to Exhibit 606 I would like to refer you to the note at the bottom.
 - Q. Okay. You can refer me to that.
- A. "Under the site specific condition the well points may indicate equipotential levels higher than the ground surface and should not be compared against the water level thresholds, i.e., color of water level legend."

These wells were screened 20 feet to 25 feet in the ground to whereas the piezometers were screened 5 feet below grade surface. This program was set up to monitor the piezometers. After the failure these well points could make some of the readings hard to see for the piezometers. To get better clarity on the chart, we took the well points out.

- Q. It wouldn't just make readings hard to see.

 They would make the evidence hard to live with, wouldn't they, Mr. Buttram?
 - A. No, sir.
- Q. You had documents that said, Exhibits 1552 and 186, that said you are responsible for monitoring wells and piezometers in a document you created. Wells were monitored and in fact you never thought to take them out of your spreadsheet until after the disaster. Then you

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provided to him by Mr. Williams along with the e-mail.

September 19, 2011/Buttram/Direct 1 We would offer Exhibits 3610, and 3611. I don't believe 2 there is objection to it. 3 (Exhibit Nos. P-3610, 3611 were marked for identification.) 4 5 MR. MARQUAND: If the witness can identify each one, that would be great. We would not object at 6 7 that point. 8 BY MR. FRIEDMAN: 9 I guess what we need you to do is to look at 10 those two exhibits. Can you find them? They were 11 attached to the memo you were talking about, we were 12 discussing. I believe they are attached. 13 THE COURT: It might be with 3609, if you 14 have 3609 pulled. 15 THE WITNESS: My 3609 only has three 16 copies of 3609 with just one sheet. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: 17 Then if you would, please, look at 3610 and 18 3611. I believe that was the information that 19 20 Mr. Williams forwarded. We need you to confirm that, if 21 would, please, sir. 22 Your Honor, while he's looking at that, the 23 plaintiffs would offer Exhibits 1555 and 1584. Those 24 are the e-mails between Mr. Buttram and Mr. Dotson and 25 the representative of Geosyntec.

A. These appear to be the attachments that I
received for the monthly reading of November, 2008.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

MR. MARQUAND: No objection to 3610 or 11.

THE COURT: So admitted.

(Exhibit Nos. P-3610, 3611 were

(Exhibit Nos. P-3610, 3611 were

received in evidence.)

BY MR. FRIEDMAN:

- Q. Mr. Buttram, we have covered a lot of ground today. I am about to wrap up. I need to ask you, if I could, sir, do you remember speaking with a man who has been identified as an expert in this case for TVA? His name is William Walton or Bill Walton. Do you remember speaking with him?
 - A. Yes, sir, I have spoke with him.
- Q. And he has talked to you on occasions about what you saw out there at the Kingston facility during your October inspection, correct?
- A. Yes, sir. We have had discussions on the inspection.
- Q. And at one point Mr. Walton sent you an e-mail, I believe, and if you would look at Exhibit 196 and tell us if that is the e-mail you received or a copy of the e-mail you received from Mr. Walton.

(Exhibit No. P-196 was marked for

(Exhibit No. P-19

identification.)

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A. Yes, sir. I recall receiving this e-mail.

This is an e-mail dated Saturday, June 20th,

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2009, from Mr. Bill Walton to yourself, Jamey Dotson,

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and others at TVA, is that right?

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A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

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Q. And the subject of the e-mail is your October 2008 inspection, correct?

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A. Yes, sir.

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Q. And the subject of this e-mail is some questions that TDEC had about the pictures from the inspection, did I state that right?

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A. Yes, sir, that's correct. There were I believe two or three pictures they referenced.

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Q. Do you remember what pictures were referenced?

The point of Mr. Walton's question to you in

1516

A. No, sir, I believe there is an e-mail that specifies the time stamp of which pictures they were

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18 referring to.

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20 this June 20th, 2009, e-mail that I would like to ask

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you about is in the very last sentence beginning with

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"again." It says "again, we did not see from your photos and inspection report that there was visible or

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spoken evidence of slides, sloughs or subsidence." Did

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I read that correctly?

A. Yes, sir.

- Q. And then if you turn the page of Exhibit 196 there is a follow-up e-mail to the group, the TVA group, from Jamey Dotson asking "did anyone respond to Bill Walton's inquiry?" Do you see that?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And following that you took it upon yourself to call him to respond, remember?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And if you turn the page, I guess if you turn to the fourth page you see something from Mr. Snider.

 Does that reference the photo that was the subject of your conversation with Bill Walton?
- A. Yes, our conversation was a discussion of this TDEC matter, his review of our report.
- Q. Did it involve any of the photographs from the north dredge cell?
- A. The photos in the TDEC e-mail I don't believe referenced any from the north dredge cell.
- Q. When Mr. Walton asked you and your group for confirmation that there were no visible or spoken evidence of slides, sloughs or subsidence, was his question based on the photograph that is reflected here pertaining only to the south side of the dike?
 - A. Sorry, I can't recall the exact conversation,

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- Q. All right. There is and we know from Exhibit 189 and the way points that were recorded by Jamey Dotson, there is at least four references to slough conditions, referencing slough out there at the time of your inspection. One of the references to slough is as to the north dike that collapsed, correct?
- A. Mr. Dotson does have the description of slough. I can't come confirm his definition of a slough.
- Q. Because you all never went over a definition.

 We understand all that. The references are in the document. The point of my question is this. Did you ever make that information known to Mr. Walton at the time he was making his inquiry here?
- A. Mr. Walton was welcome to all information out there. I can't say at this time we discussed these points in general.
- Q. Now, when you, and I am wrapping his up, when you first put your report together did you ever attempt to make it appear that you had prepared your inspection report for the stability of the Kingston dikes before the failure of the dikes occurred?
- A. Could you state that again. I am sorry. I misunderstood the question.
 - Q. If you would, look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 185.

	September 13, 2011, Buttlam, Birect
1	Do you recognize that page?
2	(Exhibit No. P-185 was marked for
3	identification.)
4	A. Yes, sir, I do.
5	Q. Read that statement into the record, please:
6	A. "Subsequent to the inspection and the writing
7	of this report catastrophic failure at the north end of
8	the dredge cells occurred. The cause of the failure is
9	currently under investigation."
10	Q. Now, that statement is incorrect, isn't it?
11	A. Yes, sir, that is an incorrect statement.
12	Q. Who corrected it?
13	A. After one of the reviews it was noted, found
14	that it was written in the wrong context.
15	Q. Wrong context being you didn't write your
16	report until after the dike failure, did you?
17	A. Correct. The report was written after the
18	dike failure.
19	MR. FRIEDMAN: Plaintiffs would offer
20	Exhibits 196 and 2894, representing the Walton memos.
21	THE COURT: Any objection?
22	MR. MARQUAND: No objection to 196. I
23	didn't hear the other numbers.
24	THE COURT: 2894.
25	MR. FRIEDMAN: 2894.

	September 19, 2011/Buttram/Cross
1	MR. MARQUAND: No objection to 2894.
2	THE COURT: So admit both documents.
3	(Exhibit Nos. P-196, 2894 were
4	received in evidence.)
5	MR. FRIEDMAN: The final exhibit is 166
6	which is a page from the draft 185, I apologize.
7	THE COURT: 185?
8	MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
9	MR. MARQUAND: No objection to Plaintiff's
10	Exhibit 185.
11	THE COURT: So admitted.
12	(Exhibit No. P-185 was received in
13	evidence.)
14	MR. FRIEDMAN: Nothing further, Your
15	Honor.
16	THE COURT: Thank you, cross-examination.
17	CROSS EXAMINATION
18	MR. MARQUAND: May it please the Court,
19	Brent Marquand for defendant TVA.
20	THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed.
21	BY MR. MARQUAND:
22	Q. Mr. Buttram, you were asked about the July 8th
23	2009, interview that you participated in that was
24	conducted by two individuals from TVA's Office of
25	Inspector General. Was there a transcript of that

Ī	September 19, 2011/Buttram/Cross
1	interview?
2	A. No, sir, not that I am aware.
3	Q. Was it recorded?
4	A. Not that I am aware of.
5	Q. Were you provided a copy of a statement to
6	review?
7	A. No, sir.
8	Q. I would like to direct your attention to
9	Plaintiff's Exhibit I believe it's 189. I believe
10	during your testimony you said there was some confusion
11	about some of the numbers. 189, can you tell us what it
12	is again, please?
13	A. Yes, sir, if you look on the second page and
14	you look to the far left at the row of numbers
15	Q. Tell me, what is 189?
16	A. 189 is the way points that Jamey Dotson sent
17	to me after the inspection.
18	Q. And Column A is what?
19	A. Column A is the location and date.
20	Q. And so rows, 2 through 20 are what location?
21	A. Looking at the spreadsheet, they would be for
22	Widow's Creek.
23	Q. Does that have anything to do with your
24	October 20th, 2008 inspection?
25	A. No, sir, those way points would not be for
	176

Ī	September 19, 2011/Buttram/Cross
1	Kingston.
2	Q. And which way points have anything to do with
3	the Kingston inspection?
4	A. The Kingston inspection would be rows 21
5	through 30.
6	Q. Were they designated as certain way point
7	numbers?
8	A. Yes, sir, column B has the way point number.
9	Q. So, way point number 20 is in which row?
10	A. Way point 20 corresponds to row 21.
11	Q. Is that the confusion you were taking about?
12	A. Yes, sir, if you move to the next page there
13	is no way for me to tell if the row number specified on
14	page 3 were the actual way point numbers.
15	Q. Row 20 is not a Kingston way point?
16	A. If the row numbers correspond to each other,
17	yes, sir, row 20 would not be a Kingston way point.
18	Q. Counsel asked you to count how many or
19	actually I think he asked you and said are there four
20	sloughs shown here on the Kingston way points, is that
21	correct?
22	A. From what I recall, yes, sir.
23	Q. Look at this and tell me.
24	A. Yes, if row 20 is included, that would be.
25	Q. I thought row 20 would be a Widow's Creek way
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1	problems with just calling that an erosion area.
2	Q. Let me show you Page 7 of Plaintiff's 191.
3	Did you identify those as areas of erosion?
4	A. Yes, sir, those areas were identified as just
5	an erosion washout.
6	Q. Had Mr. Dotson identified those in his way
7	points as sloughs?
8	A. Mr. Dotson identified it as a "slough road
9	washout."
10	Q. And where in the area of the ash disposal
11	facility was that particular photograph taken? Can you
12	point to it on this, on Plaintiff's Exhibit 193?
13	A. I believe it was somewhere in this.
14	Q. It was on the north dike?
15	A. I was on the north dike in this general area
16	there.
17	Q. Okay. Counsel asked you about whether or not
18	there was erosion above or below this particular
19	washout. I have here a photograph which is from TVA
20	Exhibit 34. It is TVK-277812. What is that area along
21	above the washout. Can you tell us
22	(Exhibit No. D-34 was marked for
23	identification.)
24	A. That would be the bench.
25	Q. For the Court, for all of us, what is a bench?
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- A. As these facilities are raised upstream they will create a bench level which is a flat/semiflat area usually sloped in so it can drain without washing over the sides. These benches also allow vehicles to travel upon them around the facility.
- Q. And I believe in your testimony that you said that it was something about this bench or something about the crest of this bench being tilted one way or another. Can you explain that, please?
- A. Yes, sir, for this erosion washout to happen, the bench was not properly sloped back into the toe. It was sloped a little bit back out towards the outer slope.
 - Q. It was sloped down from the --
- A. I was sloped down, yes, sir, from the toe of the upper slope there. If any rain occurred, it would all drain to this area and concentrate, which then would cause this erosion washout.
- Q. Can we see the area where it is sloped down in this particular photograph?
- A. It looks to be directly above that erosion area there.
- MR. MARQUAND: Your Honor, we tender TVK-277812, which is a part of TVA Exhibit 34.
 - MR. FRIEDMAN: No objection.

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- Did you see any evidence of any slides or subsidence in your inspection?
- No, sir, there was no evidence of any slides or sloughs out there. Everything that we saw was mainly erosion or where the water had concentrated and was causing a little bit deeper erosion.
- When you removed the word "immediately" from the drafts of your report with respect to the different features which you initially said should be repaired immediately, did that change the substance of your report?
- No, sir, I did not believe it changed the substance of the report. The word "immediately" at that time was for emphasis and at the writing of this report and submittal of it there was no emphasis for those specific areas at that time.
 - Ο. Why not?
- Because the failure had happened and there were other things being done at Kingston at that time. These repairs and maintenance would not have been able to be done.
- I wanted to ask you about your report, Exhibit 191. You were shown the very last page of it. Can you tell us what that is?
 - Α. Yes, sir. That is a general sketch of the

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It is not to scale, but it is just used as a reference. It had been used in prior reports to show the general location where photographs were taken during the inspection report.

- How accurate is this diagram with respect to the accuracy of the locations of the photographs?
- The accuracy of this sketch is not very good Α. because it doesn't have any of the bench levels around the dredge cell. It has just kind of got some general lines to kind of give the border areas of anything. These pictures are in very approximate locations just to kind of point the person in the right direction.
- Q. Let me show you Plaintiff's Exhibit 1552. This is the groundwater monitoring system process that you put together. What was the, what groundwater was being monitored?
- This document was created for the monitoring of the drive-point piezometers on the west dike. would have been monitoring the groundwater on the west dike.
- Were you attempting to monitor any other Q. monitoring wells or holes in the ground anyplace else besides the west dike?
- No, sir, the responsibility stated here were solely for the monitoring of the west dike.

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- Q. And why was, why had that system been put together?
 - A. After they had the blowouts in 2003 and 2006 to help with the repairs they installed these piezometers and well points first to help with the repair and then afterwards they used it as extra data just to continue to monitor the groundwater level on the west dike.
 - Q. If you would, look at -- I want you to look at three plaintiff's exhibits, 3609, 3610 and 3611.
 - A. I have them, sir.
 - Q. Were there attachments to 3609?
 - A. Yes, sir, there were two attachments to 3609, two Excel spreadsheets that contained the raw data from the inspector that went out and gathered it.
- Q. And do you have the two spreadsheets there?

 Are they 3610 and 3611?
 - A. Yes, sir, 3610 and 3611 are the two attachments.
 - Q. Take a look at them and tell me what data is in 3610.
- A. 3610 has the data for the west dike for the piezometers and the well points.
 - Q. Did you use that data?
 - A. This is the data that I used and would input

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1	into the spreadsheet that Geosyntec had created.
2	Q. What is Plaintiff's Exhibit 3611?
3	A. 3611 are monitoring wells.
4	Q. And where are those located?
5	A. To my knowledge all these monitoring wells are
6	just located throughout the dredge cell.
7	Q. Did you use that data?
8	A. I did not use this data.
9	Q. Was that part of the data you were supposed to
10	use in the Geosyntec program?
11	A. I had no responsibility with this data. The
12	only data I used came from 3610.
13	Q. Can I have Plaintiff's Exhibit 606, please.
14	If we could enlarge it. Do you see where it says well
15	ID on the left-hand column?
16	A. Yes, sir.
17	Q. Does that correspond to the ID numbers in 3610
18	or 3611?
19	A. These well IDs correspond to the IDs located
20	in 3610.
21	Q. And Plaintiff's 606 is the Geosyntec output,
22	right?
23	A. Yes, sir.
24	Q. Is there anyplace in that program to input the
25	monitoring well data in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3611?
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1	A. No, sir.
2	MR. MARQUAND: No further questions.
3	Thank you, Mr. Buttram.
4	THE COURT: Thank you.
5	Redirect?
6	MR. FRIEDMAN: Very briefly, Your Honor.
7	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
8	BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
9	Q. Mr. Buttram, we have kept you here a long
10	time. I appreciate your patience.
11	Did I just hear you say you didn't see any
12	sloughs, when you were out there that day in October?
13	Is that your sworn testimony? You want to change that
14	answer?
15	A. Well, based on what I know today, yes, sir, I
16	did not see
17	Q. Excuse me. What about what you wrote in your
18	own notes?
19	A. Yes, sir, I know that in my notes the word
20	"slough" was mentioned. At the time
21	Q. At the time you were out there you thought you
22	saw a slough, didn't you?
23	A. Yes, sir, I believe I stated that sloughs can
24	be opinionated depending on who you ask.
25	Q. Well, you had an opinion while you were out
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there doing this inspection you saw a slough. Now you have an opinion that is changed because you are a witness in a case against the TVA? Is that what is changing your opinion?

- A. No, sir. I was asked what I thought now. Did I see anything out there.
- Q. When you were out there, at the time you thought you saw a slough. No question about that, right? When you were out there at the time doing this inspection, the one designated to write up the report, the annual stability report, you thought you saw a slough, right?
- A. I wrote down a slough, but not a slough that would be associated with a slope failure, no, sir.
 - Q. You didn't include it in your report, did you?
- A. No, I did not have my notes at the time I wrote the report.
 - Q. They just happened to be missing.

Now, let's just talk about real quick this business about all the deletions of the term "immediately" being taken out of the repairs in the final report. Did I understand your testimony that you didn't include "immediately" because the disaster occurred and there was no need to do maintenance out there any more? The pressing nature of it was all gone?

- A. No, sir, I felt that since the disaster had happened the word "immediately" did not add the emphasis that it would have prior to it. I didn't feel it changed the substance by removing the word "immediately."
- Q. In other words, there is no need to shut the barn door once the cow is gone, right? It is too late to do immediate repairs when the dike has failed, right? Is that what you are trying to tell the Court?
- A. I am just trying to say what I, my personal thought, what I thought at that time that the word immediately -- I'm not saying that the repairs still didn't need to be done. In essence it was stated in the report, I just didn't feel the word "immediately" added the emphasis at that time.
- Q. Well, I understand what you are saying because Exhibit 191, which is your final report, you have two pages of recommendations for maintenance that needed to be done on those dikes. We read through them. You still want maintenance to go on out there, but the urgency since the disaster occurred has passed. Can we agree on that?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- MR. FRIEDMAN: No further questions, Your thonor.

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1	THE COURT: Anything further,
2	Mr. Marquand?
3	MR. MARQUAND: None, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Mr. Buttram, you may be
5	excused.
6	MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, we have another
7	witness we can start with today or we can wait until
8	tomorrow. It's up to the Court.
9	MR. FRIEDMAN: Before Mr. Buttram leaves,
10	we do not want to release Mr. Buttram from his subpoena.
11	We ask that the witness, as it pertains to his
12	testimony, remain sequestered.
13	THE COURT: Mr. Buttram, just so you are
14	advised. You are still under subpoena. You may have
15	been informed about the rules of sequestration. You
16	should not discuss your testimony with other witnesses
17	or potential witnesses or anyone else's testimony
18	discussed with you in the event you may be recalled as a
19	witness by either party in this case.
20	THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused
22	for now.
23	Why don't we go ahead and break. I have a
24	few other matters to handle upstairs. We'll plan to put
25	in a full day tomorrow. Why don't we start fresh. That
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September 19, 2011/Buttram/Redirect way you can get all of the documents fresh and we'll start at 9:00 tomorrow, which would be September 20th. We'll see everybody here and try to get started right at 9:00 a.m. on September 20th. Thank you. (Court was recessed.) I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS AN ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.